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THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT*
WILLIAM H. SIMON**
INTRODUCTION
Within a five-minute walk of the Stony Brook subway stop in the
Jamaica Plain section of Boston, you can encounter the following:
* A renovated industrial site of about five acres and
sixteen buildings that serves as a business incubator for small
firms that receive technical assistance from the Jamaica Plain
Neighborhood Development Corporation (JPNDC), a
nonprofit community development corporation, which is also
housed there. Known as the Brewery after its former
proprietor, a beer-maker, the complex is owned by a nonprofit
subsidiary of JPNDC.
m A 44,000-foot "Stop & Shop" supermarket. The
market opened in 1991 after years in which the community had
been without a major grocery store. It lies next to a recently
renovated Community Health Center and a large high-rise
public housing project. The land on which the market and
health center sit was developed and is owned by a limited
partnership that includes, in addition to a commercial investor,
JPNDC and the Tenant Management Corporation of the
housing project. Some of the income from the market and
health center leases goes into a Community Benefits Trust
Fund that supports job training and business development
activities.
* A cluster of small, attractive multi-unit residential
buildings containing a total of forty-one homes. These units
were built with support from the Federal Low Income Housing
Tax Credit, and they are occupied by low and moderate
income families at rents limited to thirty percent of family
income. The buildings are owned by a limited partnership in
which the general partners are a subsidiary of JPNDC and a
resident cooperative; the limited partners include five
* Adapted from WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT (Duke Univ. Press 2001).
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conventional business corporations and a nonprofit corporation
with a board composed of prominent government and business
figures that promotes housing development throughout the
state.
Two recently renovated apartment buildings-one
with eleven units and one with forty-five units-designed with
common areas and facilities for medical support for elderly
residents. The project benefits from large federal grants. It is
owned by JPNDC; the units are rented to the tenants at rents
that cannot exceed thirty percent of their income.
* A wood-frame building containing three apartments
recently renovated by JPNDC with support from various
public programs. JPNDC then sold it at a price well below
market value to an individual, who, as a condition of
ownership set out in the deed, must live in one of the units and
rent the others only to people who meet specified income
eligibility conditions at specified rents.
These institutions are products of the Community Economic
Development (CED) Movement. Although it is unusual to find so many
concentrated in such a small area-there are still others there that I have
not mentioned-such projects can be found in most cities; their numbers
have increased substantially in recent years, and there will be many
more of them if current programs succeed. Such projects figure
prominently in the most optimistic and innovative approaches to urban
poverty on both the left and the right. They exemplify a kind of social
entrepreneurialism that is flourishing across the country.' As support
for traditional welfare and public housing programs has waned, there
has been a corresponding (though far from proportionate) increase in
support for CED. The Movement has been fueled by trends toward
decentralizing public administration on the one hand and channeling the
development of local markets along socially desirable paths on the other.
It has also been encouraged by changes in the contours of urban politics,
especially new strategies by neighborhood activists.
Though there are many variations, the core definition of CED
embraces: (1) efforts to develop housing, jobs, or business opportunities
for low income people, (2) in which a leading role is played by
nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations and (3) that are accountable to
1. See generally HAROLD A. MCDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEw THEORY
OF COMMUNITY (1993); HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE NEIGHBORHOODS: PROGRESSIVE
CITY GOVERNMENT IN CHICAGO, 1983-1987 (Pierre Clavel & Wim Wiewel eds., 1991);
PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD (1994) (discussing the Dudley Street area of Boston).
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residentially defined communities.2  Part I of this Article surveys the
increasing focus on such efforts in a broad range of public programs.
A cluster of convergent policy rationales that, broadly viewed,
represent at once a theory of local economic development, a strategy of
social policy implementation, and a vision of grassroots democracy
support these efforts. These "three logics of community action" are
explored in Part II.
The focus here is on the institutional configuration of CED
practice. I suggest that the Movement has developed a set of structures
that usefully responds to the social forces emphasized in the "three
logics of community action" discussed in Part II. These innovations
represent an enduring achievement that promises a broad range of
productive applications. This is not, however, a full-scale appraisal of
community-based social policy. Such an effort would require a larger
body of information than we possess, and it would also have to consider
the interactions of the local values and forces emphasized in the CED
perspective with competing values and surrounding structures above the
local level.
I. THE TURN TO COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIAL
POLICY
CED practitioners think of the Movement as a grassroots affair. To
begin an account of CED by reviewing national, regional, and state
support structures might strike them as looking through the wrong end
of the telescope. Yet, no one denies that grassroots CED activities
depend on an elaborate network of larger-scale efforts. Moreover, the
increasing salience of CED in political and policy discourse can be most
readily seen in the recent growth of national, regional, and state
programs designed to encourage and sustain it.
2. The average population of a community development corporation (CDC)
community was 69,000 and the median was 32,500 in a 1992 study of 130 CDCs. Avis
C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 38 (1992). The range is broad. The Bronx Overall
Economic Development Corporation, which coordinates the Federal Empowerment Zone
program in the South Bronx, serves an area of about 100,000. The Jamaica Plain
Neighborhood Development Corporation, as well as the CDCs I discuss below in East
Palo Alto, California, and the Dudley Street area of Boston, have constituencies of about
25,000. Optimal size, of course, depends in part on the types of projects the
organization undertakes. Job training tends to be done over larger areas than housing,
and community development corporations within small areas may find larger real estate
projects beyond their means. But generalization is difficult. In Marin City, California,
where a CDC recently completed a major housing and commercial project, the
population is only about 2,500 residents.
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A. General Planning: The Revival of Redevelopment &
"Community Action"
Looming over the current CED Movement are memories of two
earlier experiments in community development, "urban renewal" or
Redevelopment (a word I capitalize to indicate that it is a term of art
referring to a special legal process), and the Community Action
Program. Both are widely regarded as discredited, and to some extent,
the current Movement has been shaped in reaction to their failures.
However, in some respects, current efforts might also seem to be a
continuation and vindication of the earlier movements.
1. REDEVELOPMENT
The Redevelopment process was created by the states under the
impetus of the National Housing Act of 1949, which provided grants
and other support for local efforts to revitalize "blighted" areas. The
federal grant program came to be called "urban renewal." The state
process it supported begins with the designation of an area as
"blighted." A municipal agency then collaborates with private investors
to formulate a plan of public and private investments to improve the
area. The agency can draw on municipal powers of spending, eminent
domain, land use regulation, and public finance with streamlined
procedures. The plan often provides for public provision of structural
improvements, as well as the condemnation and delivery to private
developers of large tracts of land, perhaps at a substantial "write down"
(below-cost price). The private developers undertake various
improvements on their own account and perhaps build community
facilities, such as parks, meeting places, or low income housing. The
plans, and ensuing contracts, often limit or designate special uses for
state and local taxes for the improvements.'
The Redevelopment process responds to a problem of coordination
pervasive in real estate development that has been thought exceptionally
severe in poor or otherwise "blighted" areas. One aspect of the
coordination problem arises from the fact that the basic local instruments
of economic development-providing tangible public goods such as
roads and parks, delivering. services such as police and schools,
regulating land use, offering fiscal subsidies such as targeted tax breaks
3. For overviews with citations to the extensive literature, see generally Sonya
Bekoff Molho & Gideon Kanner, Urban Renewal: Laissez-Faire for the Poor, Welfare
for the Rich, 8 PAC. L.J. 627 (1977); Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined:
Revitalizing the Central City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689
(1994).
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or favorable credit terms-often involve separate political processes.
Bringing them to bear simultaneously on an ambitious development
project could be cumbersome. Redevelopment combines the tools in a
single, streamlined process.
The other aspect of the problem concerns the coordination of
investments. The success of a real estate investment typically depends
on other investments in the surrounding area, both public investments in
goods and services and private investments that make the neighborhood
more attractive or produce beneficial services. In a prosperous
neighborhood, informal coordination or simply shared optimism may be
sufficient to induce separate but mutually beneficial investment.
However, in a "blighted" area, public and private investors may need
more formal commitments from each other. 4  The Redevelopment
process structures negotiation and produces binding contracts intended to
create such commitments.
Redevelopment has been harshly criticized for decades. The critics
have shown that, over and over, the development facilitated by the
process has come at the expense of the initial residents of the
communities being developed. In the worst case scenario, which has
been often enacted, it takes the form of "Negro removal"-displacing
low income, minority people by destroying rental housing or
commercial buildings they used or occupied and replacing them with
upper income housing or business facilities serving the affluent. The
West End in Boston and the Western Addition in San Francisco are two
famous examples.5
The Redevelopment process encouraged such injustice by
weakening democratic constraints on governmental aid to development,
by creating various fiscal incentives for localities to undertake the
development, and by subsidizing the private participants through
sweetheart land deals, cheap financing, tax breaks, and publicly
provided infrastructure tailored to their investments. There is
substantial evidence that the returns in economic growth to public
Redevelopment investments have been small or negative and that the
distributive effects of the program have been, on balance, regressive.
In 1974, the federal government ended specific support for
Redevelopment and folded these funds into the Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program.' Under this program, resources are not
4. A similar premise applies to new or "greenbelt" communities being built
from scratch and accounts for another category of specialized development procedures
applicable to these communities. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING
AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 631-51 (4th ed. 1995).
5. Molho & Kanner, supra note 3, at 643-62.
6. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V 2000)). The related
2002:377
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tied to specific projects or types of projects; instead, local governments
have discretion to decide how to spend them within broad parameters.
Nevertheless, Redevelopment did not die, surviving as a state law
process. In some states, its use expanded in the 1980s and 1990s under
the impetus of property tax limitation efforts, such as California's
Proposition 13. By limiting revenues from the existing tax base, these
measures prompted local governments to seek new taxable
development! The consequence in California has been called "the
fiscalization of land use"; municipalities exercise their regulatory power
over land use with a view to enhancing their tax revenues.' The
Redevelopment process is especially attractive in this regard for two
reasons. First, it streamlines large-scale development and second, the
statutes typically allow local government to keep a larger share of tax
revenues attributable to Redevelopment efforts than they keep from
revenues arising from conventional sources."0 Counties, school districts,
and other taxing entities claim larger shares of the non-Redevelopment
tax base."
Federal support remained substantial even after the expiration of
the "urban renewal" program. Although CDBG funds were not tied to
Redevelopment projects, local governments that wanted to could so use
them. Moreover, the federal tax code has continued to permit localities
to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance Redevelopment projects. 2
The fiscal attractions of Redevelopment are great enough in some
areas to prompt local officials to characterize relatively prosperous
areas, and even vacant land, as "blighted"; in California, many
Redevelopment projects do not involve low income neighborhoods. The
process continues to attract critics, who call it a wasteful public subsidy
and arbitrary in its effects on taxation. However, assessments of its
potential for low income neighborhoods are far less negative than in the
past, and some prominent Redevelopment efforts have been viewed as
CED success stories.
Urban Development Action Grant program came on line in 1977 but has since expired.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1994).
7. See WILLIAM FULTON, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 208-13 (1991).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 213.
10. Id. at 242-61.
11. Id.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 144(c) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). Lynne Sagalyn estimated that
the annual value of the tax subsidy for Redevelopment finance in the 1980s considerably
exceeded the annual amounts of direct expenditures under the prior "urban renewal"
program. Lynne B. Sagalyn, Explaining the Improbable: Local Redevelopment in the
Wake of Federal Cutbacks, 56 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 429, 432 (1990).
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Statutory reform has strengthened the requirements of community
participation and provided safeguards and remedies for displacement.
California, for example, requires the formation of a "Project Area
Committee" with representation of residents, community organizations,
and businesses. 3 If the project involves displacement or the use of
eminent domain, the committee must be chosen through an election
publicized throughout the area. 4 The committee may be entitled to
financial and technical support from the Redevelopment agency. 5 The
Project Area Committee is entitled to information from the
Redevelopment authority and is to be consulted on major decisions."
While it cannot veto a project, it does have potentially significant voting
rights. If the Committee votes against the project, then the project may
only proceed on a two-thirds vote by the Redevelopment authority,
rather than the usual majority. 7 A thick body of judicial precedent also
gives residents who oppose projects the right to challenge them in court
on a variety of procedural grounds (for example, compliance with
Environmental Impact assessment requirements or consistency with the
city or county plan).' 8
Since the 1970s, federal law applicable to both federal projects and
federally-supported state and local projects has given important rights to
displaced tenants; homeowners and businesses also have strong
relocation rights.'9 Some states, including California, have enacted
similar protections for projects with only state support.2" For example,
displaced tenants are entitled, in addition to moving expenses,2' to
payments designed to compensate them for any increased rent they must
pay for the next five years in their new apartments.' The
reimbursement formula potentially compensates the lowest-income
tenants by more than the costs of displacement and hence can leave them
better off for being displaced. 3
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33385 (West 1999).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 33388.
16. Id. § 33386.
17. Id. § 33385.5.
18. GOLDFARB & LIPMAN, A LEGAL GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT 87-
88 (2d ed. 1994).
19. 24 C.F.R. § 42.325-.375 (2000).
20. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260 (West 1995).
21. 24 C.F.R. § 42.350(b) (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(d)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (1994).
23. The federal standards require protection against rent increases for five years;
the California standards, for three and a half years. Id. § 5304(d)(2)(A); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 7264 (Supp. 2002). Both federal and California law require that the
compensation must enable the tenant during the period of protection to pay no more than
thirty percent of his or her income for the new apartment. 42 U.S.C. §
2002:377 383
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Finally, if low or moderate income housing is eliminated by the
project, federal and sometimes state law requires that localities build
comparable replacement housing within a few years.2  California
further specifies that twenty percent of the incremental tax proceeds
attributable to the project be used to fund affordable housing
development. 25
Some of these provisions are unenforced, and others can be
circumvented or neutralized by a determined Redevelopment agency.
But they do make abuse more difficult and increase the likelihood that
development will involve grassroots participation and benefit. Here, for
example, are two recent examples of Redevelopment activity that seem
consistent with CED aspirations.
The City of East Palo Alto, California, is a low income minority
area of about 25,000 residents. It has been desperately short of public
revenues since its inception. The City can honestly be described as
"blighted"; it has poor public services, a substantial crime problem, and
despite rising land prices, has had comparatively little private
investment. Yet it sits in the middle of booming Silicon Valley and
contains large tracts of underdeveloped land. Aside from the fiscal
incentives mentioned previously, the Redevelopment process offers an
opportunity to induce greater investment by coordinating public and
private efforts and to streamline the development process in a way that
allows benefits to be widely shared.
Since the City is relatively small and participation in municipal
government is extensive, citywide governmental processes have a
"community" character. The City Council sits as the Redevelopment
Agency, and its activities are closely and widely followed. In the
planning for the first of its projects to reach the active development
phase-a large commercial center along the highway that separates the
city from the rest of Silicon Valley-several community organizations
pressed with some success for various community benefits. For
example, a "First Source Hiring Ordinance" gave preference to local
5304(d)(2)(A)(iii)(I); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260(i)(3). Moreover, California requires
that the compensation must be based on the cost of a new apartment that complies with
the Health & Safety Code. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7260(I)(1). Since many low
income people pay more than thirty percent of their income for housing and most live in
sub-Code apartments, the formula can leave them better off for being displaced. On the
other hand, if the residents are being displaced from the community entirely because no
satisfactory housing is available for them, then the payment might be viewed as
compensation for the loss, not just of current benefits, but of the opportunity to enjoy the
community benefits of the new development. From that point of view, it would be less
likely to seem excessive.
24. 24 C.F.R. § 42.375; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413(a) (West
1999).
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.2 (West 1999).
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residents for jobs in the project area and general commitments for
affordable housing to be built by nonprofit developers. The Project
Area Committee and affiliated Resident Councils were active both in
organizing their constituents and negotiating with the Redevelopment
Agency. The project has displaced 150 families, but they too, have
shared in its benefits. A few have received subsidized units in the city's
first affordable housing project. The rest have received relocation
payments averaging about $70,000, arguably large amounts for vacating
dilapidated apartments in which they were tenants-at-will.
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) in the Roxbury
area of Boston is another example of a Redevelopment project that
appears to involve genuine community control.26 DSNI is a nonprofit
corporation devoted to organizing residents around development
planning. It operates in a low income minority neighborhood with a
population about the same size as East Palo Alto. The neighborhood has
suffered severely from poverty, crime, and disinvestment, and in the
early 1980s had an appearance of unredeemed physical devastation.
DSNI has sponsored a variety of projects, including social service
programs, a new town "common," and a few hundred units of
subsidized housing. It has been credited with improving the delivery of
social services and reversing the trend of disinvestment. Its processes
are widely considered a model of grassroots accountability and
involvement.
In collaboration with the City of Boston, DSNI has made striking
use of the Redevelopment process. Pursuant to a long dormant
authorization in Massachusetts Redevelopment law, the City has
delegated to DSNI various Redevelopment powers, including eminent
domain.2" DSNI's physical revitalization plans required acquisition of
hundreds of small lots, mostly absentee-owned, many with untraceable
ownership. This is a classic case where eminent domain seems
necessary. In Boston, however, where Redevelopment-driven eminent
domain has historical associations concerned more with liquidation than
with revitalization of low income neighborhoods, the city's ability to
engage in large-scale condemnation without arousing community
opposition is constrained. By delegating the power to a community-
based organization, the City of Boston neutralized much fear and
suspicion.2"
26. See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 1.
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, §§ 3, 11 (1932).
28. State "brownfields" programs, which proliferated in the 1990s, should be
mentioned as a specialized but important type of Redevelopment process. The programs
are designed to facilitate remediation and development of environmentally-contaminated
sites. They offer prospective developers financial assistance, liability protection, and
relaxation of clean-up requirements. Some explicitly condition benefits on a showing of
2002:377
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
2. FROM COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCIES TO EMPOWERMENT ZONES
The Community Action Program emerged from the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, the controversial centerpiece of the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations' War on Poverty. A central provision of
this act contemplated the delivery of a range of social services through
"Community Action Programs" (CAPs). The Act provided for
certification and support by the federal government of a single
"community action" agency for low income urban neighborhoods. Both
public and private nonprofit agencies could apply, but in either case,
they were obliged to demonstrate "maximum feasible participation of the
residents" of the geographic areas in which they were focused. 29 The
agencies were expected to administer a range of services, most notably,
educational enrichment and job training programs, but also including
"community economic development."
The CAP program was an attempt to force decentralization of urban
government. One premise was simply that municipalities were often too
centralized and bureaucratic to effectively design and deliver services to
poor neighborhoods. Another was that many municipalities were
dominated by white political coalitions insensitive to racial minorities.
The program responded to the first problem by inducing the formation
of neighborhood institutions and giving them responsibilities for social
service administration. It responded to the second by setting up
relations between these local agencies and the federal government that
were substantially independent of local power structures.
These programs disappointed the expectations of their designers in
two distinct ways. For the most part, the citizen participation goals
were never realized. Turnout in elections tended to be tiny, and
ongoing involvement in the CAPs was limited. The programs tended to
be dominated by their staffs, or in some cases, unaccountable boards.
At best, the organizations were competent service providers; at worst,
they were inefficient and patronage-ridden. Some CAPs appear to have
been more effective in mobilizing constituents, but they were no more
successful as organizations in the long run. These programs tended to
engage in confrontation with established municipal power structures to
demand more resources and attention to their communities. Although
community support. Although these programs are not targeted at low income areas,
many toxic sites are located in such areas, and community-based organizations have
occasionally made effective use of the programs to support beneficial development. See
generally Lincoln L. Davies, Note, Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case
Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 285 (1999).
29. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202 , 78 Stat.
508, 516.
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such confrontation was exactly what some of the program's designers
hoped for, the protests from established local Democratic figures came
as a surprise to Lyndon Johnson, who had no taste for inner city
mobilization that threatened the Party's core constituents. The federal
government failed to support the activist CAPs and came to regard them
as liabilities.30
Unlike Redevelopment, the Community Action Program did not
survive in name (though many CAPs continue as local social service
providers), and its activities withered in the 1970s. One small fragment
that did survive, however, played a significant role in the CED
Movement. In 1968, the Equal Opportunity Act was amended to
provide for grants to "Community Development Corporations," which
were defined as locally-initiated nonprofits focused on the problems of
low income areas. At least half of the seats on the organization's
governing body were required to be held by residents of the relevant
geographical area.31 After the Office of Economic Opportunity was
abolished, this grant-making function went to the Community Services
Administration, later renamed the Office of Community Services within
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The HUD
Community Services Program is a small operation, most interesting for
its links to the past, though it has continued to support notable projects.
Both the "Brewery" business incubator and the "Stop & Shop"
supermarket project in Jamaica Plain benefited from its grants. The
Community Services Program was one of several, including the
Community Reinvestment Act and others to be discussed shortly, that
encouraged community groups that had been founded as protest
organizations and/or social service delivery agencies to reinvent
themselves as economic developers.
Moreover, the federal urban grant programs that succeeded the
Community Action Program, most importantly the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, continued to mandate
"public participation," though more ambiguously and less ostentatiously
than in the past. The CDBG program requires that municipalities have a
"citizen participation" plan that includes publicity about plans and
opportunities, public hearings, and technical assistance to groups
interested in applying for grants,32 Although this is a far cry from the
CAP idea of facilitating the formation of a community-based
organization in each poor neighborhood, HUD has encouraged
municipalities to consider the option of forming "Neighborhood Strategy
30. See generally ROBERT FISHER, LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE: NEIGHBORHOOD
ORGANIZING IN AMERICA 110-20 (1984).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9807(a)(1) (1994).
32. 24 C.F.R. § 91.105(a)(2) (2000).
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Areas" in particular communities that look like promising sites for
focused assistance. The Strategy Area involves the formation of a
community-based development organization with an elected board."
Despite the lowered profile of federal support for community-based
organizations in the 1970s and 1980s, this period saw an explosion in
neighborhood activism that has been described as a "backyard
revolution,"34 a "rebirth of urban democracy,"35 and a "rise of sublocal
structures in urban governance." 36 Community groups formed to
demand more and better services from city governments. They formed;
to influence land use and investment decisions, protesting proposed uses)
with negative externalities (dumping facilities, high-density public
housing projects, freeways) and pushing for uses likely to enhance the
community (parks, schools). Many of these groups were reacting to
decades of municipal policies that appeared to lavish investment on
downtown areas at the expense of outlying neighborhoods. Some were
fueled by political re-alignments induced by migration patterns that
increased the electoral clout of minority neighborhoods (for example,
"white flight" to the suburbs followed by arrival of immigrant groups of
color).
State and local policy encouraged such developments by creating
new structures designed to enhance community participation in
municipal government-"little city halls," "neighborhood councils,"
"community boards"-and new opportunities to participate in land use
and environmental decisions and to challenge them in the courts.
Federal policy also played a role. In a study of the "rebirth of urban
democracy" in five cities, researchers concluded that in four of the
cities, community activism had resulted from local government
initiatives encouraged by CDBG and related programs, and in the fifth,
San Antonio, the grassroots Movement that had emerged without
municipal assistance had been prompted in part by the goal of
participating in CDBG allocations.37 Some states have enacted on their
33. Neighborhood Strategy Areas: City of Nashville, Tennessee, available at
http://www.hud.gov:80/ptw/docs/tnO7.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
34. HARRY C. BOYTE, THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW
CITIZEN MOVEMENT (1980).
35. JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY (1993).
36. Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
MINN. L. REV. 503 (1997).
37. BERRY ET AL., supra note 35, at 57-60, 108-14. The cities which the book
described as evincing extensive and effective grassroots activism are Birmingham,
Dayton, Portland (Oregon), St. Paul, and San Antonio. Id. at 57-60; see also FISHER,
supra note 30, at 121-52.
Briffault described the emergence of a different category of "sublocal
structures"-tax increment finance districts, special zoning districts, business
improvement districts, and enterprise zones. Briffault, supra note 36, at 508. With
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own programs of general financial support for "community development
corporations,"3 "community preservation companies,"39  or
"neighborhood assistance organizations. "'
With the advent of the Clinton Administration, the federal
government re-embraced the combination of developmental and
participatory themes associated with the War on Poverty in the
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community program.4 Announced at
the beginning of the Clinton Administration with great fanfare, the
program offered an extraordinary package of federal benefits over a ten-
year period to a small number of competitively selected "Empowerment
Zones" and a smaller package to a larger number of "Enterprise
Communities. " " After an initial application period, HUD designated
nine Empowerment Zones in 1994.43 Impressed by initial reports,
Congress then authorized funding for an additional twenty in 1997.4
Ninety-five "Enterprise Communities" received the smaller set of
benefits in 1994."
Empowerment Zone benefits include increased grants for social
services and economic development, regulatory waivers, use of tax-
exempt bonding authority, and tax benefits for employers including a
credit for wage payments to employees who reside in the Zone.46
Communities with "pervasive poverty" compete for selection by
producing "strategic plans" of coordinated public and private efforts at
housing, business, and job development.47 Congress mandated that the
some exceptions, especially the new federally-supported enterprise zones discussed in
the text, these entities are generally oriented toward, and often controlled by, businesses
and landowners, rather than residents. Id. at 523. To that extent, they are not CED in
our sense, but they are part of a common trend to decentralize municipal governance.
38. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 40F, §§ 1-5 (2000) (authorizing Community
Development Finance Corporation to provide support for "community development
corporations").
39. N.Y. Pav. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1991) (authorizing
state assistance to "Neighborhood Preservation Companies," or "community-based not-
for-profit organization[s]").
40. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-333, 63.1-321 (Michie 2000) (providing for tax
credits for donations to "neighborhood organizations," I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations,
and qualified organizations providing "neighborhood assistance to impoverished
people").
41. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Cmty. Planning & Dev., Introduction
to the rc/ez/ec Initiative, [hereinafter HUD, Introduction], http://www.hud.
gov/offices/cpd/ezec/aboutlezecinit.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2002).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. 24 C.F.R. § 597.202(b) (2001).
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affected community was to be a full partner in the development of the
plans.48 An important criterion in evaluating the plans is the extent to
which the affected community and its community-based organizations
have participated in the plan's development and their commitment to
implementing it.49 Regulations require that applicants identify the
community groups participating in the development of the plan, explain
how they were chosen to participate, describe their history, show that
they are collectively representative of the full range of the community,
and "[dlescribe the role of the participants in the creation, development
and future implementation of the plan. 5 0
The "Empowerment Zone" idea combines themes from both
Redevelopment and Community Action while attempting to respond to
the salient criticisms of both. Like Redevelopment, it seeks to
encourage coordination of large-scale public and private investment. It
has, however, a considerably broader vision of investment that includes
social services and physical improvements. Most importantly, it defines
the goals of the program in terms of benefit to the "community," which
it identifies with its current residents,51 and mandates broad community
participation. The social service themes and the emphasis on
community participation resonate with the Community Action Program.
The programs, however, do not bypass local government to fund
community groups directly. Nominations for Enterprise Zone status
must come from government entities.52 Instead, the program gives state
and local governments material inducements to support and cooperate
with community groups by making such support and cooperation the
central eligibility criterion for benefits. Moreover, in contrast to the
Community Action Program, the program does not contemplate support
for a single organization to mobilize and represent the entire
community; it assumes that there will be multiple community-based
organizations involved, with no one of them necessarily predominant.
A further reassertion of Community Action themes at the federal
level came with the 1998 revision to the Community Services Block
Grant program, which provides funds to local governments for a
48. 26 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(2)(B) (1994).
49. 26 U.S.C. § 1391(f); 24 C.F.R. § 597.201(c).
50. 24 C.F.R. § 597.200(d). "The Initiative recognizes that local communities,
working together, can best identify and develop local solutions to the problems they
face." HUD, Introduction, supra note 41. An assessment of early efforts of the first
round of designates found mixed results in terms of community participation. See
generally Marilyn Gittell et al., Expanding Civic Opportunity: Urban Empowerment
Zones, 33 URB. AFF. REv. 530 (1998).
51. 24 C.F.R. § 597.201(a).
52. Id. § 597.200.
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panoply of social programs.53 The statute describes the purpose of the
program as "to provide assistance to States and local communities,
working through a network of community action agencies and other
neighborhood-based organizations" for poverty alleviation and
community revitalization.' It prescribes that specific expenditures be
coordinated under a general plan formulated with "maximum
participation of residents of the low-income communities and members
of the groups served. ""
B. Housing
The model of public housing institutionalized in the National
Housing Act of 1934 involved rental housing constructed, owned, and
operated by local public housing authorities (PHAs)*6 The Housing Act
created a system of federal financial assistance to local PHAs for
building and maintaining such housing under guidelines enforced by
federal authorities, currently the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. The guidelines restrict eligibility for housing to
applicants who meet specified measures of low or moderate income
status and restrict the rent charged to residents to (currently) thirty
percent of the household's income. 7
In the 1970s, a different model designed to enlarge both tenant
choice and private market incentives was introduced. Under the
"tenant-based Section 8" program, a local agency distributes certificates
to eligible low income applicants. 8 The certificate obligates the agency
to pay a portion of the applicant's rent on a qualifying apartment leased
from a private landlord.59 The portion is currently the difference
between an amount intended to approximate the market value of the
leasehold and thirty percent of the certificate holder's income.' The
holder then pays thirty percent of his or her income to the landlord.6"
The holder has to find a landlord with a suitable apartment willing to
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9901 (Supp. V 2000).
54. Id. § 9901(1).
55. Id. § 9901(2)(D).
56. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (2000).
57. Id. § 1715z-1.
58. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., OPTING IN: RENEWING AMERICA'S
COMMITMENT TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1999) [hereinafter HUD, OPTING IN],
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/optingin.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2002).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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accept the certificate and to enter into a triangular relation with the
holder and the administering agency. 6'
The conventional model of PHA-owned-and-operated housing has
steadily fallen into increasing disfavor since the 1960s. Some of the
complaints focus on a particular physical configuration that is now
discredited-the large high-rise located in a desolate area of concentrated
poverty. Projects of this sort have long been considered breeding
grounds for crime and other social pathologies. This view has led to a
re-orientation of public housing design toward smaller, lower, more
attractive, and more dispersed projects. Some of the older, high-rise
projects have been demolished, and HUD is funding the demolition or
rehabilitation and redesign of others. PHAs continue to be active in the
development of the newer style of projects, and they play important
roles in HUD's demolition and rehabilitation programs.
However, another set of criticism questions the efficacy of PHAs
more generally. PHA-owned housing is substantially more costly to
build and maintain than comparable private housing, and
notwithstanding the greater costs, it is often poorly maintained,
sometimes horrendously so. The prevalent explanation points to the
familiar limitations of public bureaucracy: poor incentives and
information. PHAs have been monopolists largely immune from market
pressures and highly vulnerable to political pressures that compromise
efficiency. They have been organized in a centralized fashion that
concentrates discretion at the top among administrators with limited
knowledge of conditions in the projects they manage.
Although the matter is controversial, many believe that "tenant-
based" private housing assistance programs have not performed any
better.63 This model does not directly produce new housing, and critics
assert that private supply of low-end housing is not strongly responsive
to the increased demand induced by the certificates. Moreover, the
certificate model has incentive and information problems of its own.
The administering agency has to estimate the market value of the
leasehold in order to calculate the proper subsidies. It has no market
incentive to get things right, and it has limited information. Because of
resource constraints, the agencies set uniform levels across broad
geographical areas. They are thus certain to get the figures wrong for
many apartments and may well do so for most. To the extent that the
standards underestimate the market value of minimally adequate
apartments, the subsidy is not enough to induce landlords to rent to
certificate holders. Thus, a substantial number of those awarded
62. Id.
63. E.g., Jenifer J. Curhan, The HUD Reinvention: A Critical Analysis, 5 B.U.
PuB. INT. L.J. 239, 243-45 (1996).
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certificates, some studies suggest between twenty and forty percent,
return their certificates unused because they can't find appropriate
housing.' To the extent that the standards overestimate market rents,
subsidies are excessive and resources wasted. The amount HUD pays
above market is estimated to be as high as $1 billion per year.6 The
tenant has no incentive to search or bargain for a lower rent since the
program pays the difference between thirty percent of her income and
the standard.
In the many areas where it is hard to find an eligible apartment with
a landlord who will accept a Section 8 certificate, tenants are not in a
good position to enforce the landlord's obligations. They may fear that,
if they complain, the landlord will evict or refuse to renew the lease.
Thus, Section 8 landlords have been known to demand side payments
above the legal maximum from their tenants and fail to perform basic
maintenance.' Others object that the calculation of the tenant's rent
share on a percentage basis reduces incentives to achieve self-support.67
The first Bush administration, under HUD Secretary Jack Kemp,
and the Clinton Administration, under Secretaries Henry Cisneros and
Andrew Cuomo, responded to the dissatisfaction with these established
models with a more or less common approach that looks simultaneously
in two quite different directions. One, which looks away from the
Community Economic Development Movement, is voucherization.
Vouchers resemble Section 8 certificates in their portability; recipients
use them as subsidies in leases negotiated with private landlords.
However, they differ from Section 8 certificates in providing for
64. Id, at 250-51 & nn. 90-97.
65. HUD, OPTING IN, supra note 58, at 22.
66. Legal aid lawyers in the San Francisco area have told me that tenants
frequently make such complaints but refuse to assert their rights to the authorities for
fear of retaliatory eviction.
67. A third variation is "project-based" Section 8 private housing assistance in
which the government subsidizes the construction or rehabilitation of privately-owned
housing in return for an agreement by the owner to rent only to eligible tenants at
specified rents for a specified period. Such programs are designed to directly induce
increased supply, but they suffer from information problems similar to, and in some
respects more severe than, the "tenant-based" assistance programs. Here the contracts
between the government and the owner run for twenty years or more, rather than, as
with "tenant-based" assistance, for one to three years. If the subsidy turns out to be too
low and rents are insufficient to cover costs, the owner, whose obligations are usually
nonrecourse and under-collateralized, can insist on a bail-out or walk away. Thus, in
the adverse market conditions of the 1970s, mass defaults created a crisis. If the subsidy
turns out to be higher than necessary, the owner recovers excess profits during the term
of the contract, and if there is substantial appreciation, he can escape the use restrictions
at the end of the term and capture the appreciation. Thus, in the boom market of the
1990s, HUD faced an expiring use crisis. See generally HUD, OrING IN, supra note
58.
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payment of a flat amount that does not vary with the negotiated rent and
is not measured in terms of an estimate of market value. They are thus
administratively simpler, and because the recipient bears full
responsibility for the portion of the rent that exceeds the voucher
amount, she has an incentive to seek the lowest rent. However, like
certificates, vouchers do not directly increase housing supply and are
thus unsatisfactory to those who believe the private market is not
strongly responsive to demand-side subsidies. Moreover, vouchers
operate through individual action by geographically-dispersed recipients
and thus do not induce the types of institutions and experiences
associated with Community Economic Development.68
The other tendency in recent HUD programs resonates strongly
with CED. A 1997 HUD publication interprets recent policy shifts as
an abandonment of "traditional top down" perspectives in favor a
"community-building" approach encouraging "initiatives to create a
network of partnerships among residents, management, and community
organizations or enterprises."69
First, there is an emphasis on tenant participation in PHA projects
that dates to the 1960s but has been strengthened in recent years.
HUD's declared policy is to encourage resident participation "in all
aspects of [a project's] overall mission and operation."7 °  HUD
mandates that local PHAs recognize and consult with duly-organized
Tenant Councils.7  It stipulates various democratic procedural
requirements for such Councils and makes available technical assistance
and material support for them.72
More ambitiously, HUD encourages resident management.
Residents are invited to form Resident Management Corporations to bid
to assume management responsibilities from the PHA. The management
corporations must be nonprofit corporations that meet specified
requirements designed to insure accountability to tenants generally.73
Again, technical and material assistance is available to qualifying
corporations.
HUD's current major support for PHA construction is for the
rehabilitation or demolition and replacement of "distressed" projects.74
68. Compare Curhan, supra note 63, at 241 (arguing against vouchers), with
Stephen B. Kinnaird, Public Housing: Abandon HOPE, but Not Privatization, 103 YALE
L.J. 961, 966 (1994) (arguing for vouchers).
69. ARTHUR J. NAPARSTEK ET AL., COMMUNITY BUILDING IN PUBLIC HOUSING:
TIES THAT BIND PEOPLE AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 14 (1997) (prepared for HUD).
70. 24 C.F.R. § 964.11 (2001).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 964.100-.115.
73. See generally id. §§ 964.120, .150.
74. Id. § 971.1.
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Funds are allocated in a competitive process in which one of the
requirements is a showing of consultation with tenants regarding the
plan.
75
Second, some HUD programs promote home ownership by low
income people in various ways, including the sale of PHA housing to
tenants. The first Bush Administration entertained the idea of
converting most of the PHA stock into ownership, but such plans now
seem unrealistic given the limited financial capacities of low income
people to finance such purchases and maintain the buildings.
Nevertheless, some ownership programs continue to operate. 76  The
ownership interests created by such programs typically manifest, at least
temporarily, the equity limitations characteristic of CED property rights.
Moreover, they are most commonly collective ownership interests in
which the residents exercise their rights through cooperative
corporations or homebuyers associations. 7
Third, many HUD programs now combine housing with services or
financial assistance designed to assist residents in achieving economic
self-sufficiency. These programs often have a community focus. HOPE
VI, a major revitalization program, requires that ten percent of its grants
be used for services such as job training and placement, day care, and
substance abuse counseling. 7' Residents often have responsibility for
developing and occasionally, for administering these plans.79 HUD's
Tenant Opportunity Program provides funding and technical assistance
for business activities of residents.' s Section 3 of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968 requires that PHA construction
projects accord an employment preference to project residents and a
procurement preference for resident-owned businesses."
Perhaps the most significant aspect of recent housing policy for the
CED Movement is the increased importance of nonprofit, typically
Community Development Corporation, entrepreneurialism. Since the
1980s, direct federal support for new construction under PHA and
"project-based" private programs has dwindled. Directly-supported
production is now barely sufficient to replace units being demolished.
Net additions to the affordable stock depend on the efforts of private
producers.
75. Id. § 971.9.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437aaa-1 to -8 (1994).
77. Id.; 24 C.F.R. §§ 92.2, 92.254(a), 572.130 (2000 & 2001).
78. BENNETT L. HECHT, DEVELOPING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 262 (2d ed. 1999).
79. Id. at 262-63.
80. 24 C.F.R. § 964.200.
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1701u (2000).
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The current major sources of support for private affordable housing
development specially provide for nonprofit producers. The 1992
HOME program makes grants available to state and local governments,
and the grants can be put to a broad range of uses, such as increasing
home ownership and creating affordable housing options for low income
people. The program is budgeted for fiscal 2001 at $1.65 billion and is
expected to result in the production of 92,064 units of housing. a2 At
least fifteen percent of HOME allocations within each jurisdiction must
be set aside for "Community Housing Development Organizations," 3
which are defined as nonprofit organizations engaged in affordable
housing development that maintain accountability "through significant
representation on [their] organization's governing board[s] and
otherwise, accountability to low-income community residents and, to the
extent practicable, low-income beneficiaries" of its activities.' HOME
funds can also be used to provide operating support for such
organizations.8"
Other HUD programs also focus support on nonprofit developers.
A program enacted in 1990 to preserve privately-owned housing
constructed with "project-based" assistance on which use restrictions are
expiring makes available funds for the purchase of the housing by
applicants who will commit to long term restrictions. 6 The statute
designates nonprofits, along with government agencies and resident
councils, as "priority purchasers" who have an exclusive right to bid for
an initial period after the project is offered for sale. 7 Under a 1992
provision, residents' councils in PHA projects can apply to HUD to
have management transferred from the PHA; if private, the alternative
managers must be nonprofits, or joint ventures with nonprofit
participation. 8
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit, which since 1986 has been
the single biggest source of subsidy for affordable housing, also makes
special provision for nonprofit corporations. This program involves a
tax expenditure, amounting to $3.2 billion and supports production of
82. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 496 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 BUDGET].
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12771(a) (1994).
84. Id. § 12704(6).
85. Id. § 12771(a).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 4110 (2000).
87. Id. § 4110(b). Congress mandated priority for nonprofit housing developers
in the disposition of real estate assets of distressed banks.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1437w(c), (f), (m) (2000).
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80,000 to 100,000 new units of affordable housing per year. 9
Developers sell the credits to corporate investors, who become limited
partners, in return for capital contributions to the projects. Thus, even
though nonprofits have no tax liability of their own to offset with the
credits, they can make use of them in the same manner as for-profit
developers. Although the credits offset federal taxes, the federal
government allows the states to allocate them. State agencies allot them
through a competitive application process in which both private and
nonprofit developers are eligible. Seeking to enlarge the role of
nonprofit developers, Congress mandated that each state must allocate at
least ten percent of its credits to projects with nonprofit developers.' In
fact, nonprofit developers have received considerably larger portions of
the credits in most areas. In California, for example, nearly half of tax
credits were allocated to projects of nonprofit developers in the mid-
1990s. 91
An elaborate structure of intermediaries has grown up in recent
years to support community-based nonprofit housing developers. Some
of these institutions are government-sponsored entities (GSEs),
corporations specially chartered by a legislature with boards wholly or
partly publicly-appointed. There is, for example, the Federal
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and, typical of many state
examples, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Corporation. 3 Other
such institutions are nonprofits operating across many communities.
The Enterprise Foundation and the Local Initiative Support Corporation
are especially notable examples. 4 Such institutions channel public funds
or private charitable donations to provide financial and technical
assistance to community-based developers. Sometimes they participate
as equity partners; sometimes they make loans or grants for specific
projects. They often make loans or grants for general organizational
support. Sometimes they act as financial intermediaries in pooling
and/or reselling securities issued in connection with affordable housing
development.
89. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., 1997 CONSOLIDATED REPORT 56,
http://www.hud.gov:80/conreptl997.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); 2001 BUDGET,
supra note 82, at 216.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6) (1994).
91. CAL. TAX CREDIT ALLOCATION COMM., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT: REPORT ON
THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE Low INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS IN
CALIFORNIA 8 (1994) (43% of federal credits and 50% of credits under affiliated state
funded program awarded to nonprofit sponsors in 1993).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 8102 (1994).
93. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 57, § 1-17. (Law. Co-op. 1992).
94. For an extensive list, with descriptions, see HECHT, supra note 78, at 121-
203, 212-19.
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The net effect of these initiatives is that community-based
organizations now play a critical role-in some areas, the dominant
role-in affordable housing development. For example, in New York
City, PHAs account for about 3,000 units per year; conventional for-
profit developers account for another 1,500 to 2,000, while 6,000 to
10,000 units are produced by "an infrastructure of nonprofit
development groups, intermediaries, community development lending
institutions, small private developers, homebuilders, and contractors-all
of whom share a neighborhood focus, work on a small scale, and utilize
a blend of public and private resources.""
C. Banking & Credit
The limited access to credit of poor people might be viewed as an
unremarkable consequence of their poverty. Since the 1960s, however,
credit insufficiency has come to be viewed in urban policy as in part a
cause, rather than solely a consequence, of poverty. The availability of
credit in low income areas seems mediated by three distinct problems.
The first is race discrimination. Banks and government agencies
prior to the Fair Housing Act of 1968 openly practiced "Redlining"-
categorically restricting or precluding residential lending in minority
neighborhoods. Despite that statute and the subsequent Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1975, studies continue to find that people of color,
or people who reside in predominantly minority neighborhoods, are less
likely to have success in applying for credit than white people, or people
in white neighborhoods, in otherwise comparable economic
circumstances." The findings are controversial because it is difficult to
control for comparable economic circumstances, but most within the
CED Movement are convinced. The studies are amplified by a massive
body of anecdotal evidence from people of color who have had bad
experiences with the credit system.
There have been few major enforcement actions against lenders
under the civil rights statutes. Enforcement is limited by problems of
proof. The same difficulty of separating economic from racial
influences that troubles researchers, constrains the courts. Moreover,
the conventional prima facie case of credit discrimination involves a
showing that minority applicants have been denied while economically
similar nonminority applicants have been approved. Thus, lenders that
95. Kathryn Wylde, The Contribution of Public-Private Partnerships to New
York's Assisted Housing Industry, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEvELOPMENT IN NEW
YORK CITY: FACING THE FUTURE 73, 78 (Michael H. Schill ed., 1999).
96. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 50-57, 105-09 (1993).
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simply discourage minority applications, for example, by locating their
branches far from minority communities or maintaining hours
inconvenient for low income working people, are hard to reach.97
The second problem is coordination. Because real estate
investments support each other through local externalities, each lender
has a material incentive to lend where others are lending and to avoid
areas shunned by others. (The coordination problem only explains why
some neighborhoods are shunned, not why they tend to be minority
neighborhoods. Thus, if we credit the disparity studies, coordination
seems more a complementary than an alternative explanation to racism.)
We have seen that the Redevelopment process is designed to induce
investment by eliciting complementary commitments, but this process is
expensive and exceptional. Where there is no mechanism for insuring
complementary investments, poor impressions of a neighborhood can
become self-reinforcing.
The third explanation concerns information. People with capital to
lend tend to be socially distant from low and moderate income people
and the neighborhoods they live in. This distance may make it harder
for the lenders to assess the creditworthiness of these applicants and the
value of their collateral.9" Of course, lenders can hire people to make
such judgments for them, but the same social distance that impedes their
assessment of credit applicants may make it difficult for them to find
such agents. Through research and experimentation, a lender can
acquire the knowledge of a socially distant community that he or she
needs to make reliable judgments of creditworthiness. The lender may
be reluctant, however, to invest in such research and experimentation
for fear that the lender will not recover its costs. If others can observe
the results of the lender's efforts, and hence get the benefit of them
without contributing to the cost, they can compete away the gains.
These three perspectives suggest that an effective response to credit
scarcity in poor communities should not depend on difficult matters of
proof, but rather should encourage coordination and focusing of multiple
97. There have been suggestions that branching decisions that discourage
minority credit applications may trigger Equal Credit Opportunity Act liability, but they
are controversial. See the discussion of the Chevy Chase decree in JONATHAN R.
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 207-10 (2d ed. 1997).
98. There is also a coordination problem with respect to information. To be
useful, collateral has to be valued. With real estate collateral, one of the most important
sorts of information about the value of a particular property is the value of surrounding
properties. Thus, real estate appraisals generate positive externalities just like real estate
investments. The more appraisals we have of neighboring properties, the more reliably
we can value the property we are interested in. This is another reason why banks like to
lend where others are lending. Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community
Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 1561, 1569-70 (1995).
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investments, and should address the exceptionally severe asymmetries of
information that impede the assessment of creditworthiness in such
communities. The two most important recent initiatives in this area take
important steps toward these goals. These are the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), enacted by Congress in 1977 and strengthened
by new implementing regulations in 1995, 99 and the Community
Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act (CDFI) of 1994,
one of the most touted elements of the Clinton Administration's
domestic program. '0 Each of these measures has supported the trends
and institutions of the CED Movement.
While the support of the Community Development Financial
Institutions Act is direct and explicit,1°' the Community Reinvestment
Act is more circuitous and opaque. The CRA ascribes to any bank that
receives federal deposit insurance a "continuing and affirmative
obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which [it is] chartered." 1" The obligation applies to the "entire
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods,
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institution. "103 The
statute, however, does not further specify the obligation, simply
directing the regulators to "assess" each institution's compliance."
The regulations provide some structure to the assessment. Banks
must define an "assessment area" that includes their major activities and
does not gerrymander out minority or low income communities.0 5
Ratings are based on lending, investment, and service activities within
the area,0 6 with lending activities weighed twice as much as the other
two. Among the factors considered in assessing lending are the ratio of
loans made within the assessment area to deposits (the "loan-to-deposit
ratio"), the percentage of loans in the assessment area (the
"concentration ratio"), the percentage of census tracts within the
assessment area in which loans were made (the "penetration ratio"), the
percentage of loans made to low and moderate income borrowers and to
borrowers within census tracts with low or moderate average incomes."
The "investment test" measures the bank's support, through either
grants or equity investments in institutions focused on the needs of low
and moderate income residents of its assessment area, such as credit
99. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq.
100. Id. §§ 4701 et seq.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 2901(a)(3).
103. Id. § 2903(a)(1).
104. Id. §§ 2901(a)(3), 2903(a)(1) (2000).
105. 12 C.F.R. § 25.41 (2002).
106. Id. § 25.21.
107. Id. § 25.21-.25.
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unions, small business loan funds, and affordable housing developers.0 8
The "service test" looks at such factors as the accessibility of branches
and ATMs in low and moderate income neighborhoods and the
provision of specialized services, such as credit counseling or
homebuyer education, to low and moderate income customers." All
these factors are summed into an overall numerical score, which is then
translated into one of five ratings ranging from "outstanding" to
"substantial noncompliance. "10
Notwithstanding the quantitative scores, the rating process depends
largely on debatable qualitative judgments, and the regulators are often
accused of inconsistency, arbitrariness, and favoritism. Uncertainty is
further increased by the statute's failure to specify a definite sanction for
poor CRA performance. The statute provides only an invitation to the
regulators to consider CRA performance in deciding on a bank's
application to open or relocate a branch, to merge with or acquire
another bank, or to establish a bank holding company."' With
pervasive restructuring in the industry, such regulatory approvals have
often been sought in recent years. Few applications have been denied
on CRA grounds."' However, the stakes in such proceedings are often
so large, that even a tiny probability of denial, or even delay, has
proved enough to motivate many banks to strive for a respectable CRA
rating. The motivation was intensified by the 1995 regulations, which
appeared to signal an intention by the regulators to enforce more
vigorously. By one estimate, the CRA induced $35 billion in lending
and investment in traditionally under-served communities between its
enactment in 1977 and 1993."
For our purposes, two aspects of the CRA structure are most
notable. First, the CRA creates an explicit duty to "local communities"
and "neighborhoods," understood in precisely the CED sense to mean
primarily the residents of small, geographically-bounded areas. Second,
the vague and indirect enforcement structure of the Act creates a vital
role for community-based organizations. Community groups organized
around economic development issues are, other than the banks, the
major source of information for and pressure on the regulators in the
108. Id. § 25.23.
109. Id. § 25.24.
110. Id. § 25.21(c). See generally KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK
379-419 (1998).
111. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(3), 2903(a)(2).
112. Of 105,000 applications between 1977 and 1993, only 31, or .03%, were
denied on CRA grounds, though the rate rises to about 1% if only contested applications
are considered. THOMAS, supra note 110, at 87-92.
113. S. REP. No. 103-169, at 7 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881,
1891.
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ratings process. These groups can and do intervene in regulatory
application proceedings to raise CRA issues. They also use low CRA
ratings to generate bad public relations for local banks. Kenneth
Thomas describes the CRA process as a regulatory "triangle" consisting
of regulators, banks, and community groups.114
The CRA prompts many banks to engage in a variety of routine,
ongoing negotiations and collaborations with community-based
organizations, but its most visible consequences can be seen in
settlements connected to regulatory applications for mergers or
acquisitions in which consortia of groups agree not to oppose the
application in return for community development commitments. Such
settlements can involve promises to lend specific amounts or to make
loans on specified terms in low and moderate income neighborhoods, to
open or refrain from closing branches or ATMs, to make investments or
contributions to economic development projects, or to provide support to
community-based organizations. An extreme example is the set of
commitments made by Washington Mutual in its contested acquisition of
Great Western Bank in 1997. In apparent response to the efforts of two
consortia of community-based organizations, the Greenlining Coalition
and the California Reinvestment Committee, Washington Mutual
promised to lend at least $70 billion over ten years on specified
conditions within low and moderate income neighborhoods in its post-
merger assessment areas, to make charitable contributions amounting to
at least two percent of its pretax income, to close branches in low- and
moderate-income areas only under specified conditions, to meet
regularly with leaders of community-based organizations over CRA
issues, and to introduce in one area a new checking account without fees
or minimum balances. '15
Thus, a critical by-product of the CRA's effort to enhance credit in
low income neighborhoods is the empowerment of community-based
organizations. From the community's perspective, since CRA benefits
correlate with the strength of community-based organization, the Act
creates a strong inducement to form and support such organizations.
From the organization's point of view, the Act makes it possible to
extract resources from the banks that support the organization directly
(when the resources go to it and its projects) and indirectly (when it gets
local credit for bringing resources to the community).
The second of the two recent major federal initiatives is the
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. The Fund's main
activity is providing grants, loans, equity capital, and technical
114. THOMAS, supra note 110, at ix.
115. Id. at 118-20.
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assistance to "community development financial institutions."16 Such
institutions are defined as nongovernmental entities committed to
community development that serve an investment area or targeted
population and "maintain_], through representation on [a] governing
board or otherwise, accountability to residents of its investment area or
target population."' 17 Among the factors to be weighed favorably in
considering applications is the extent to which the applicant is
"community-owned or community-governed." 1 8
In enacting the bill, Congress mentioned the following types of
institutions as embraced by its CDFI definition: community development
banks, community development credit unions, and community
development loan funds.1 9 Community development banks are insured
depositary institutions with lending strategies oriented to community
development goals. 20 The best known bank of this kind is South Shore
Bank in Chicago, a widely-admired institution credited with turning
around a declining working class neighborhood.' 2
Credit unions are financial cooperatives. A community development
credit union is one in which the majority of the members are low-
income people. 22 Congress estimated there were about 150 such
institutions when it passed the act.123
Community development loan funds are nonprofit organizations
funded by donations or capital provided on favorable terms by "socially-
conscious" lenders or investors to make loans for affordable housing,
job, or business development in distressed communities. 24
Micro-enterprise funds are another type of nonprofit fund
specializing in modest loans to very small businesses. As we have seen,
this is a broad term embracing institutions engaged in planning,
entrepreneurial, or management activities involving CED. Congress
specifically mentioned "Multi-Bank Community Development
Corporations" in which banks pool funds to make CRA loans and
investments, some of which they may be prohibited from making
directly.125
116. 12 U.S.C. § 4701(b) (2000).
117. Id. § 4702(5)(A)(iv).
118. Id. §§ 4702(5)(A), 4706(a)(11).
119. S. REP. No. 103-69, at 10-12. See generally Rochelle E. Lento, Community
Development Banking Strategy for Revitalizing Our Communities, 27 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 773 (1994).
120. S. REP. No. 103-69, at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 12.
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The basic premises of the CDFI program are similar to those of the
CED Movement. CDFIs are defined in terms of a focus on a
"community" and accountability to its members. 2 ' The core CED
conception of a community defined in terms of residence and
geographical proximity is plainly included in the definition of CDFI,
though the definition ranges somewhat more broadly to include
communities defined in terms of a "targeted population" with shared
social or economic characteristics, as well as in terms of a geographical
"area."'2 7 It is also possible that a community focused on a particular
"area" might include nonresidents-for example, employees and
business owners. Both for-profit and nonprofit organizations are eligible
to become CDFIs. In practice, most beneficiaries of the program have
been organizations with a geographical focus or providing assistance
primarily to organizations with a geographical focus, often defined
primarily in terms of residence. 128 The majority have been
nonprofits. 29
A less prominent but still important federal player in this field is the
Small Business Administration, which administers a range of programs
providing credit, technical assistance, and procurement preferences in
federal contracting or federally-subsidized state contracting.
(Procurement preferences take various forms. They can allow the
relevant agency to award a contract to a preferred bidder even though
her bid is not the lowest, or require a general contractor to award a
specified percentage of the project to preferred subcontractors, or
provide a financial reward for awards to preferred bidders.) Eligibility
for some of these programs is defined principally in terms of business
size; others require an additional showing, of "economic and social
disadvantage."13 Although these criteria are not specifically framed in
CED terms, they do include some CED activities. "Community
development corporations" are specifically designated as eligible
intermediaries for support in the SBA Microloan Demonstration
Program,' and more significantly, they benefit from an exception in the
federal procurement preference program for "socially and economically
disadvantaged" people.' 32 A CDC is defined for this purpose in part as
126. 12 U.S.C. § 4702.
127. Id. § 4702(5)(A), (20).
128. See the CDFI Fund's web site, at http://www.edfifund.gov (last visited Mar.
1, 2002).
129. Id.
130. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105 (2002).
131. Id. § 120.701(e)(1).
132. Id. §§ 124.3, .105-.106, .111.
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a nonprofit organization "responsible to the residents of the area it
serves."' 1
33
At the state level, there are several agencies analogous to the
federal CDFI, including for example, the Illinois Community
Development Finance Corporation, 34 the Massachusetts Community
Development Finance Agency,'35 and the Urban and Community
Development Program of the New York State Urban Development
Corporation. 36  A broad range of private nonprofit organizations
provide similar support.
D. Job Training & Placement
Job training and placement efforts for low income people became
salient in the 1990s, as federal welfare reform sought to eliminate long-
term eligibility for employable applicants and shunt them into
employment.
American job training and placement programs have not performed
well in the past. The most salient criticism is a failure to coordinate
these efforts with demand in the job market. 37 The programs have been
poorly informed about private sector job opportunities. They have
tended to teach skills for jobs that are not the ones in demand or skills
too abstract or too narrow to fit usefully with employer needs.
The main responsibility for delivering training has been given to
local public institutions: high schools and community colleges. Such
institutions have had trouble coordinating their programs with private
employers. This may reflect an ambivalence within these institutions
about the commitment to vocational education, as opposed to preparing
students for four-year liberal arts colleges. It may reflect a suspicion on
the part of private employers of government.
The need to induce more private sector participation prompted
Congress in 1982 to mandate "Private Industry Councils" representing
local employers in the design and implementation of federally-supported
job-training programs.1 8 But private industry participation has proven
neither as easy to get nor as invariably productive as was once expected.
133. Id. § 124.3. In addition, the CDC must have received assistance under the
Community Services Program of 42 U.S.C. § 9805, which is available only to
organizations addressing the problems of low income neighborhoods. 42 U.S.C. § 9805
(1994).
134. 315 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/2 (West 1993).
135. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40F, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
136. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6254, 6255 (McKinney 2000).
137. See PAUL OSTERMAN, EMPLOYMENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION,
DISLOCATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 92-107 (1988).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994) (repealed 1998).
2002:377 405
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Opening up the program to employer participation does not guarantee
that the employers who participate will be those with the most attractive
jobs or the ones whose training needs provide the most benefits to
trainees. Some types of training are more beneficial to employers than
employees. This is notably true of training in skills narrowly relevant to
only a single job or firm, as opposed to more general skills relevant to a
broad range of jobs. Some employers may prefer to steer programs to
narrower skills because that is what they need, even though workers
would benefit more from more general training. Moreover, there is the
danger that employers will use the program not to increase training
resources, but to substitute for training they would otherwise have to do,
and pay for, themselves."'
Another limitation of traditional institutions arises from the fact,
emphasized in the social science literature of recent years, that formal
training and certification play a far less important role in the allocation
of many jobs than informal referral and vouching by incumbent
workers. These workers are in a good position to know of openings and
to vouch credibly for the reliability of the relatives and acquaintances
they refer to the employer. This process typically rests on kin or ethnic
networks that some groups, especially African-Americans, are
systemically excluded from. A public program aspiring to introduce
previously-excluded groups into such jobs would need to develop fairly
thick knowledge and relationships with both its beneficiaries and the
employers to which it referred. It seems doubtful that the community
colleges have either the aptitude or flexibility to do so. "
Community-based nonprofits supported by public funds have
achieved the most noted job training successes of recent years, usually
in alliance with community colleges or other public agencies and private
employers. The nonprofits typically play a coordinating role with
respect to government and for-profit participants and provide or design a
kind of training more tailored to both the needs of individual trainees
and the shifting demands of the job market than public institutions have
been able to offer. 4' Perhaps the most highly regarded example is the
Center for Employment Training (CET) in San Jose, California, which
has developed a training model that has been replicated with federal
support in several other places and adduced as a model in the Clinton
139. Bennett Harrison & Sandra Kanter, The Political Economy of States' Job-
Creation Business Incentives, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 424, 429 (1978).
140. For a discussion of the problem of isolation from job-allocation networks and
of a moderately successfully attempt by a CDC to remedy it, see Philip Kasinitz & Jan
Rosenberg, Missing the Connection: Social Isolation and Employment on the Brooklyn
Waterfront, 43 Soc. PROBS. 180 (1996).
141. BENNETT HARRISON ET AL., BUILDING BRIDGES: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS AND THE WORLD OF EMPLOYMENT TRAINING (1995).
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Administration's welfare reform initiative. The basic idea is an
individually customized program that combines simultaneous general
education, in-class skills training, and sheltered work experience. 142
However, the CET has not played the additional role that the labor
economist Paul Osterman has suggested community-based organizations
might play in the labor market: bringing political pressure to bear on
local employers to improve wages and working conditions. 143 Osterman
suggests that market conditions leave some employers with a range of
options as to how to use and compensate workers and that local political
pressure can sometimes influence them to adopt the strategies more
beneficial to workers, those that involve higher compensation and more
training and responsibility.'44 He thinks that CET cannot play this role
because its community base is too weak.1 4' By contrast, he points to
Project QUEST, an employment program in San Antonio, Texas,
affiliated with Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), a
network of community organizations that has achieved city-wide
political clout.146  QUEST has successfully negotiated with local
employers for commitments, not only to employ graduates of its
programs, but also to improve the compensation of the jobs involved. 47
Recent federal legislation acknowledges and encourages the role of
community-based organizations by mandating that state plans under
federally-supported training programs reflect their participation."8
E. Welfare Reform
For decades, the welfare system was charged with inducing a kind
of addictive dependence, sapping the ambition and initiative of its
beneficiaries. The claim, always prominent in popular discussion,
received support from the academic literature in the 1970s and 1980s,
though the experts remained divided. 49  Popular opinion became
overwhelmingly committed to this portrayal and led to the dramatic
cutbacks and restructuring of the welfare system in 1996.
142. See OSTERMAN, supra note 137, at 137-38.
143. PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET:
How IT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 136-38 (1999).
144. Id. at 138.
145. Id. at 166.
146. Id. at 165-66.
147. Id. at 136-39, 156-66.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2832(a), (b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 2000) (requiring that states
establish "local workforce investment boards" to oversee various federally-supported
training programs with representation from, inter alia, "community-based
organizations").
149. My own view is that the claims are largely implausible for reasons set out in
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM (1995).
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One interesting aspect of the growing discontent with welfare is that
it was partially embraced by some prominent leaders of minority and
poor communities. Few supported the cutbacks, but many expressed
sympathy for the dependency critique and spoke with sympathy about
the importance of cultivating a "work ethic" among inner city young
people. Moreover, the attacks on welfare throughout the 1970s and
1980s emphasized how vulnerable political reliance on welfare made
poor communities. Thus, discontent with welfare was associated with
increased interest in efforts to expand work and business
opportunities. "0
The most important of the 1996 reforms turned the major cash
assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
from an entitlement program committed to funding benefits at a
specified level for anyone meeting the eligibility standards to a fixed
"block grant" program ostensibly giving states more discretion with
respect to implementation but subjecting them to heightened
requirements for moving recipients into work."'
From the perspective of the CED Movement, the reform was
significant in two respects. First, it channeled administrative effort and
resources away from providing cash assistance toward job training and
development, and even business development. Second, it enlarged state
discretion to conduct support of the poor through community-based
organizations. The reform legislation provided that all services and
benefits, under the successor program to AFDC, could be provided
either directly or "through contracts with charitable, religious, or private
organizations."!52 The explicit legitimation of contracting with religious
organizations was the most controversial aspect of this provision.
Whatever one thinks of its merits, the block grant program reinforces
the trends associated with CED, since religious organizations are usually
strongly community-based." 3  In legislation revising the Community
Services Block Grant program to complement welfare reform, Congress
150. For example, Floyd Flake, former Congressman and pastor of the Allen
African Methodist Episcopal Church in Queens, a major CED player, told his
congregation, "(T]here was a time when we lived without [welfare], and if they take it
away, we can live without it againl" James Traub, Floyd Flake's Middle America, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Oct. 19, 1997, at 64. Flake argued that the self-esteem that comes with a
"good work ethic" is one of the best defenses against the psychological pressures of
racism. Id.
151. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.
(Supp. V 2000)).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (Supp. V 2000).
153. On the religious organization provision, see generally Paul W. Ambrosius,
The End of Welfare as We Know It and the Establishment Clause, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 135 (1996).
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explicitly emphasized the centrality of "community action agencies and
other neighborhood-based organizations" as providers and mandated
"maximum participation of residents" of the communities served."
As with housing, however, there is another current in the welfare
reform debate that flows away from CED themes. This current includes
proposals for employment subsidies that supplement wages, such as the
present Earned Income Tax Credit, and "individual development
accounts" that match savings, or relatively unconditional "stakeholder"
grants. 155 These programs typically contemplate relatively centralized
government administration, and they are not designed to strengthen the
recipients' ties to a local community. Anne Alstott associates them with
"mobility policies" intended to enhance recipients' ease of exit from
their present communities into new ones."'
F. Community Health Care
A variety of public and private programs support delivery of health
care through community-based organizations in low income
communities.' 57 Among the rationales for this approach to health care
delivery, two are especially pertinent. First, patients in low income
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9901.
155. Wage supplements reward work by paying benefits in proportion to wages
earned within a specified, usually low income, range.. See generally EDMUND S.
PHELPS, REWARDING WORK: How TO RESTORE PARTICIPATION AND SELF-SUPPORT TO
FREE ENTERPRISE (1997).
"Individual development accounts" reward savings by matching amounts put aside
by the beneficiary. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h)(2) (Supp. V 2000). Typically the accounts must
be intended and used for housing, business investment, or post-secondary education. Id.
A variety of small-scale experiments are underway to test the utility of these accounts.
See the web site of the Corporation for Enterprise Development, at
http://www.Cfed.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). In connection with welfare reform,
Congress authorized the states to use federal welfare grants to support such programs
run by either public agencies or nonprofits. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h)(3).
"Stakeholder" grants contemplate a one-time transfer of a large sum to the
beneficiary at the outset of adulthood. Their use is less restricted or supervised than that
of individual development accounts, and they are not conditioned on work or savings.
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, their most ambitious proponents, would have the
state provide every citizen $80,000 at age eighteen so long as they have graduated from
high school and do not have a serious criminal record. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN
& ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
156. Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment
Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 1007 (1999). Although these general reform proposals
imply centralized administration, there is a potential role for community-based
nonprofits in demonstration projects, such as those authorized by Congress in 1998. 42
U.S.C. § 604(h). Many community-based nonprofits are experimenting with them.
157. See generally Lewis D. Solomon & Tricia Asaro, Community-Based Health
Care: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 235 (1997).
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areas seem especially vulnerable to neglect and abuse by for-profit
providers. Such communities have difficulty attracting able physicians,
and their members' relatively low levels of education and limited
experience with health care impair their ability to negotiate with and
monitor their doctors individually. Nonprofits sometimes have an
advantage in attracting doctors motivated to give good care and have
greater incentives to monitor certain aspects of quality.
Second, limited education and perhaps non-mainstream cultural
backgrounds often lead poor people to seek preventive care less often
than would be desirable. They tend to rely on emergency care in ways
that are both more expensive and less conducive to good health than
certain patterns of preventive care. Thus, outreach and education are an
exceptionally important part of the health care needs of poor
communities. This requires various types of local knowledge in order to
identify health needs, design programs that are accessible to clients, and
coordinate with institutions such as schools and workplaces. These tasks
may be especially difficult for large, mainstream institutions to the
extent that local residents are culturally distant from the mainstream.
Community-based organizations have long specialized in developing
such knowledge.
The most salient of the various community health programs is the
federal government's Community Health Center program, which
provides grants and loan guarantees to nonprofit institutions that provide
outpatient care to the residents of "medically underserved" geographical
areas. To qualify as a statutory Health Center, the organization must
have a governing board that is "representative" of its service area and in
which a majority are patients.'58
Unlike the situation in the other policy areas discussed above,
interest in community-based practice in health care has not grown
dramatically in recent years. Nevertheless, the older programs
continue, and some predict that disillusion with the current for-profit,
managed care models will lead to a revival of interest in health care
provision by nonprofit community organizations.
Support for community health sometimes plays a significant role in
CED. For example, the "Stop & Shop" supermarket developed by the
Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation shares its
building with the Martha Eliot Health Center, which is supported by a
Boston hospital and various federal and state programs. The inclusion
of the health center made the project more attractive to various
supporters, including the City of Boston, which donated the land, and
158. 42 U.S.C. § 254b(a), (b), (j)3)(H) (Supp. V 2000).
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the Center drew on its own sources of support to share in the
development and construction costs.'59
II. THREE LOGICS OF COMMUNITY ACTION
CED institutions have three salient functional characteristics. The
first is relational density and synergy. CED efforts are designed to
multiply the contexts and roles in which people confront each other. As
the political process links political activity to residence, so CED links
economic development to residence. By striving to internalize control
over economic processes within the community, CED increases the
number of linked roles that residents potentially play. People who might
otherwise encounter each other only as neighbors now meet as
employers and employees, sellers and consumers, property owners and
property occupiers, planners and citizens, administrators and service
recipients.
The second is geographic focus. At the most mundane level, the
physical community is a focal point, a convenient space to bring people
together for multiple, varied encounters. More ambitiously, a
residential community can give physical expression to a sense of
distinctive common culture. The new social policy now emphasizes the
call of modem urbanism with space for "detail, identity, and a sense of
place," as opposed to, for example, "the anonymity of much public
housing that is divorced from its surroundings.""'°
The third characteristic is face-to-face encounters. CED efforts
tend to replace remote impersonal relations, for example, between
absentee owners and tenants or customers, or distant bureaucrats and
their charges, with face-to-face relations. In doing so, they extend to
economic development generally a basic principle of land use planning-
the physical structure of the urban environment should be configured so
that there will be more face-to-face interactions among neighbors.' 6'
For example, Jane Jacobs's four principles of land use planning-mixed
use, short blocks, buildings of varying age, and density-are all
159. The Brownsville Community Development Corporation of Brooklyn likewise
used novel economic development practices, including an unprecedented use of state
bond finance, in the course of establishing itself as a major community health center.
See Brian Glick & Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as House
Counsel to Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The East Brooklyn
Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 105, 123-33 (1996-97).
160. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BUILDING
COMMUNITIES: TOGETHER: GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING
FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES (1994).
161. Id.
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designed to increase the number and variety of face-to-face
encounters. 16
There is no single dominant theory of CED. Rather, these
programs rest on a variety of convergent rationales. They can be
grouped in three clusters: economic, social, and political.
A. Economic
CED programs arise in part from dissatisfaction with bureaucracy.
The principal economic complaint about bureaucracy is that bureaucrats
have poor incentives and poor information. Because they do not have
strong personal stakes in their decisions, their motivation to perform
well is weak. Because power tends to reside at the top, while critical
information is dispersed at the bottom, the key decision-makers tend to
be poorly informed.
The economist's stock alternative to bureaucracy is the market. But
economists acknowledge that markets have incentive and information
problems too, and they are more likely than bureaucratic organizations
to be thwarted by difficulties that can be called coordination problems. 6
Market limitations with respect to incentives, information, and
coordination seem especially important in the principal areas of CED
activity-housing, job training, and job and business development in low
income communities. So the turn to CED also reflects a sense of the
limits of conventionally understood markets.
1. INCENTIVES: EXTERNALITIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES
The market's ability to provide efficient incentives does not apply
to externalities-costs and benefits of activities that are not reflected in
the prices faced by those who engage in them. Externalities are
unusually important in housing. According to some people, they are the
whole ball game. Real estate agents insist that the three most important
162. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 143-222
(1961). Short blocks are valued because they disperse foot traffic through areas that
would otherwise be empty. Id. at 178. Old buildings are valued because they increase
the range of economically viable uses, and hence the diversity of people attracted to
them. Id. at 187.
163. On market failure in employment and business, see generally PAUL
KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 35-67 (1991); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS,
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1992). On market failure in housing,
see ROLF GOETZE, UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: THE ROLE OF
EXPECTATIONS IN URBAN REVITALIZATION (1979); Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the
Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: "Milkng" and Class Violence, 15
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1989).
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determinants of the value of a residence are "location, location, and
location," which implies that the value of your house depends more on
what your neighbors do with their property, how they behave, and who
they are, than on any decision you make about your property.
The unpriced consequences of property maintenance and investment
decisions include both conduct and physical conditions. For example,
the "broken windows" approach to crime control asserts that even minor
visible physical deterioration may have a psychological effect that
encourages deviant behavior (which in turn feeds back to further reduce
maintenance and investment).'
"Factor externalities" are another category. They involve activities
that affect the costs of labor or supplies to businesses. When a
community college or a private employer trains workers in generally
useful skills, they potentially lower the costs of other employers by
enhancing the supply of qualified workers. Businesses often benefit
from the local presence of workers with needed skills or from other
businesses that supply needed services or products. They also benefit
from the presence of other businesses in the same field, to the extent that
the businesses collectively can attract a better labor pool or a larger field
of suppliers to the locality. The larger number of workers and suppliers
may mean lower costs because of greater supply or economies of scale.
It also creates possibilities of "technological spillovers" through
knowledge shared either through cooperation or as workers move from
firm to firm. Industrial districts such as Silicon Valley and the auto
manufacturing areas of Detroit illustrate these phenomena. To a limited
extent, such externalities seem susceptible to influence by public goods
and land use policy.
A notion related to, but distinct from, externality is
complementarity. Individual investments are complementary when the
productivity of each is greater when they are made simultaneously. An
individual's efforts to get rid of cockroaches in an urban apartment or
weeds on a suburban lawn will be more effective to the extent that
neighbors make similar efforts. An investment in software that will
improve the operation of a particular machine may increase the returns
to investment in the machine.
Like externalities, complementarities involve benefits or costs to
people other than the primary actor, but they differ in requiring that the
beneficiary make investments of her own in order to capture the
benefits, and increasing her incentives to make such investments.
Externalities and complementarities may overlap, and it may be hard to
distinguish the two phenomena. If your neighbors paint their houses,
164. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe,
ATLANTIC, Feb. 1989, at 48.
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you will benefit simply because the neighborhood is more attractive (an
externality effect); it may also be true that the benefit from painting your
house will now be greater than if they had not painted theirs (a
complementarity effect). This might be true because people value a
house's consistency with the esthetic norms of the neighborhood. An
investment with complementarities has a potential leveraging effect by
inducing complementary investments.
2. INFORMATION
There is evidence in Part I that there are creditworthy people in low
income neighborhoods who cannot get mortgage loans. Probably the
same is true about business loans. There are also able workers who
cannot get available jobs. These facts may reflect discrimination, but
they may also reflect the difficulty lenders and employers have in
distinguishing these people from superficially similar applicants who are
not creditworthy or able. Lenders and employers have this problem
with all credit and employment applicants, but it may be exceptionally
difficult with low income and minority applicants for two reasons.
First, these applicants have few assets. To the extent that an
applicant can post assets as security for loan commitments, the lender
has less need to rely on assessments of her reliability. Assets perform
an informational role as well. An applicant who puts her own assets at
risk by investing in a house or business or in training that fits her for
particular jobs "signals" to others the seriousness of her belief that the
investment is a sound one and her intention to act to make it work. Poor
people are less able to substantiate their commitments in this way.
Second, lenders and employers may have more difficulty evaluating
the applications of poor people because they are more socially distant.
Their credit and employment histories look different, and superficially
similar events may have different meanings for poor applicants than
more mainstream ones.
3. COORDINATION
Externalities and complementarities mean that the values of local
investments are interdependent, and this means that protecting them
often requires coordination. Painting my house will do little to improve
its value if my neighbors all allow theirs to peel. In prosperous
neighborhoods, informal coordination or shared optimism may be
sufficient to induce optimal behavior. In poor neighborhoods, anxiety
and pessimism often inhibit spontaneous coordination.
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Indeed, poor neighborhoods are sometimes vulnerable to a kind of
negative coordination-panics or downward spirals of disinvestment.
People lose confidence and start to withdraw their capital or leave
simply for fear that others will do the same.
Studies [have shown] that property owners are extremely
sensitive to small signs of physical deterioration . . . . With
every additional property owner who decides not to invest, it
becomes increasingly likely that others will reach similar
decisions, even if they are otherwise disposed to maintain their
buildings. At some point, a threshold is crossed, beyond
which the pattern becomes self-reinforcing and irreversible.'65
Although everyone would prefer that all remain and continue to invest in
the neighborhood, in the absence of some mechanism to insure each that
the others will do so, people exit for fear of being the last one left.
The mirror image of the downward spiral of disinvestment is the
speculative bubble on which prices spiral upward, as investors buy in
the hope of a quick resale to other investors. Prices are driven not by
"fundamental" assessment of the value of the property to a user or
occupier, but by expectations about what other speculators will be
willing to pay. Bubbles can be temporarily self-sustaining in the manner
of Ponzi schemes, but like Ponzi schemes, they must collapse at some
point. The process does not cause physical deterioration directly, but
some believe it deters tangible improvement and even maintenance. It
may do so by bringing in purchasers with a short-term mentality who
are interested in gain through financial transactions rather than tangible
investment. In addition, the economic instability induced by bubbles
makes it difficult to calculate the profitability of investments; so people
may be inclined to defer projects until conditions settle down. Bubbles
involve large transaction costs, and they can cause displacement of
tenants.
Not all, or even most, housing price inflation has the quality of a
speculative bubble. Bubbles seem most likely to be operating when
sharp increases are followed by sharp declines. Many observers of the
Boston housing market have interpreted developments at various times
in recent decades as at least partly bubbles."6
Bubbles are a kind of coordination problem. On average, people
would be better off if everyone declined to participate. However, from
165. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 96, at 131-32.
166. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 1, at 11-14. On bubbles generally, see
GOETZE, supra note 163, at 11-26; Karl E. Case, The Market for Single-Family Homes
in the Boston Area, NEW ENG. ECON. REv., May/June 1986, at 41-44.
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any individual's point of view, if the others are going to participate, it
may be hard to pass up an apparent opportunity to profit by selling
before the burst. Moreover, if the neighborhood is likely to be worse
off after the burst, the bubble might cause a stampede effect like a
downward spiral. At the same time outsiders are rushing to buy before
things go up further, insiders, who may be more risk averse and less
affluent, rush to sell before the crash.
There is a well known coordination problem with respect to
education. Employers may be reluctant to train workers for fear that the
workers will leave before the costs of training have been recaptured.
Workers may be reluctant to pay for training for fear they will not find a
job or will not keep one long enough to recover their costs.
4. AN EXAMPLE: SOUTH SHORE BANK
CED programs do not respond to these difficulties by abandoning
markets or reverting to conventional bureaucracies. They create
structures that combine and rearrange a variety of organizational
attributes. However, at the center are usually community-based
organizations characterized by multistranded relations, geographical
focus, and face-to-face relations. These characteristics have some
capacity to mitigate the problems of incentives, information, and
coordination. They do so by facilitating informal negotiation and
collective action. The geographical focus means that the membership
will include people with tangible stakes in each other's activities and
investments. Multistranded relations create economies of scope in the
development of information; information generated through one strand
can often be used in another strand. Face-to-face dealings enhance
possibilities for both gaining information and for negotiating
coordination.
As an example of a CED institution that seems especially
responsive to these economic problems, consider the South Shore Bank,
founded in 1972 in what was then a seriously distressed neighborhood of
Chicago.1"7 A group of social activists was able to raise $3.2 million in
philanthropic support to buy an existing commercial bank. They then
proceeded to re-orient the bank's practices to support a CED strategy.
The South Shore Bank is owned by a nonprofit holding company
that controls several for-profit subsidiaries and nonprofit affiliates: The
City Lands Corporation is a for-profit that develops residential real
estate projects; the Neighborhood Institute is a nonprofit that operates
167. Ronald Grzywinski, The New Old-Fashioned Banking, HARv. Bus. REv.,
May-June 1991, at 87-98.
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training and social services programs.' 68 The Institute has a subsidiary
of its own-TNI Development Corporation-which also conducts
affordable housing development. 169 The Neighborhood Fund, a for-
profit, is a minority-enterprise small business investment corporation
licensed and supported by the Small Business Administration. 7 °
Shorebank Advisory Services, a for-profit, provides consulting on
development banking issues. 171
The bank's lending strategy has four especially interesting features.
First, in "concentrated lending," the bank focuses its commercial real
estate lending on a specific community, and within the community on
specific areas targeted for development. 7 1 Second, in "leverage," the
bank tries to focus commercial lending in a way that complements its
affiliates' subsidized housing development. 71 It makes commercial
loans to private, preferably small and local developers to build or
rehabilitate housing near the subsidized projects its affiliates are
developing. 74  Development activities occur in mutually reinforcing
"concentric rings" of private and NGO-led effort.175
Third, in addition to being geographically targeted, some of the
bank's private lending is conditional. The bank initially limited its
purchase-money lending for rental properties to borrowers planning to
live on the premises. 176 It eventually relaxed this requirement, but it has
continued to insist that the borrower commit to rehabilitate the
property. 177 It will not lend to landlords who simply want to hold the
property for speculative purposes or to "milk" it to maximize short-term
return while permitting it to deteriorate. 17
Finally, the bank's affiliates provide technical assistance to its local
landlord borrowers on such matters as construction, maintenance,
regulatory compliance, and accounting. Many of these borrowers are
new landlords entering their first business venture. Experience in the
training programs has developed face-to-face, mutually supportive
168. Grzywinski, supra note 167, at 94.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 94.
173. Id. at 95.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 95.
176. Id. at 94.
177. Id.
178. New York City's "Neighborhood Entrepreneurs" program, which sells
property acquired by the city through tax foreclosure to small private landlords, requires
that the buyers be "based in one of [the low and moderate income] neighborhoods
targeted by" the program. David Reiss, Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program in New
York City, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 325, 330-31 (1996).
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relations among them. Two ethnically-based networks of small
landlords-one African-American, the other recent Croatian
immigrants-have developed; they maintain and continue to invest in
small-scale, moderate-rental property."" The bank's founder insists that
these people could not have been identified through conventional
business methods: "[H]ad we conducted a market survey in 1973 to get
a sense of how many potential entrepreneurs we had in the community
. . . the answer would have been 'none' . . . . [These people were]
invisible, and now they're an industry-the core of the South Shore's
recovery. " 0
Here we have an institutional structure designed to facilitate
coordination among private investments with public investments, and of
real estate investment with training opportunities. It also strives to
canalize for-profit activity in ways most likely to produce positive
externalities. Moreover, it generates the kind of multistranded relations
that create economies of scope in information.
B. Social
The sociologist's complaint about bureaucracy and markets is that
they engender alienation-a sense of disconnection and ineffectuality.
The remedy for alienation is "empowerment," a pervasive term in CED
rhetoric. The ideal of "community" associated with "empowerment" is
significantly different from the Romantic conception that influenced the
1960s left. The Romantic conception connotes intimate, indiscriminate
altruism. But the "community" of the CED Movement has more sober
and restrained connotations. The most important of these connotations
are captured in the sociological themes of Social Capital and the
Protestant Ethic.
1. SOCIAL CAPITAL
Robert Putnam popularized the term "social capital" in a study
vindicating de Tocqueville's claim about the democratic importance of
associational life.' Comparing the performances of Italy's regional
governments, he found that the large variation in quality correlated
strongly with the scope and density of a region's associational activity.
179. Id. at 96.
180. Id.
181. ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS
IN MODERN ITALY (1993); see ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 485-
88 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966)
(1835).
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Regions with many broadly participatory civic institutions were able to
induce a high level of governmental performance; those without them,
were not.
CED strategies are responsive to this notion. Multistranded
relations induce people to encounter each other repeatedly in different
but related capacities-as citizens, employers and employees,
landowners and residents, business owners and customers. Each
encounter is an opportunity to develop collaborative capacities, and
there is a synergy among the relations. People's self-confidence,
knowledge of their neighbors, and capacities for negotiation and
deliberation spill over from one sector to another and hence develop
cumulatively with collaboration across different areas. Moreover, CED
strategies tend to increase the expectation of consistent repeat dealings
among people whose encounters would otherwise be sporadic. This
encourages collaborative effort by increasing the likelihood that
particular acts of collaboration can be reciprocated, or particular acts of
trespass sanctioned, by the beneficiary or victim in the future.
We have noted that the geographic focus of CED strategies creates
a focal point for collaborative effort and gives physical expression to a
sense of common interest and identity. The face-to-face theme in CED
is sometimes associated with a Romantic celebration of the intrinsic
superiority of personal over impersonal relations. More often, we see
face-to-face relations valued as conducive to social capital. Part of the
idea is that one is likely to be more understanding of and respectful
toward the interests of people of whom one is personally aware.
Another part is the suggestion that the sense of being observed creates a
potentially healthy pressure to conform to local norms. This is the basis
of Jane Jacobs' notion of "eyes on the street," the primary goal of her
planning precepts. Safe and attractive neighborhoods are neighborhoods
in which people are actually or potentially watching each other. The
sense of safety comes in part from the probability that others will give
assistance in the event of crisis. But it also rests on the belief that the
experience of being watched itself inhibits deviance.
CED strategies apply this principle to economic relations. They
assume that one will be more scrupulous in fulfilling duties that are
associated with face-to-face relations and they try to induce such
relations. Consider the "peer lending" feature of the famous Grameen
Bank, the widely replicated Bangladesh microcredit program that has a
ninety-eight percent repayment rate on loans to a huge class of rural
women who had been written off as uncreditworthy by mainstream
lenders. To apply for a loan from Grameen, an applicant has to
assemble a group of five to ten comparably situated (though not
necessarily previously acquainted) people. Loans are made to group
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members one at a time; all group members guarantee repayment of each
loan, and no member can receive a loan until all prior ones are repaid.
This structure works by converting an impersonal duty into a personal
one. 182
2. THE NEW PROTESTANT ETHIC
Putnam speaks of social capital in the liberal rhetoric of solidarity
and respect, and this rhetoric has influenced the CED Movement.
However, much CED rhetoric has a more hortatory tone. This rhetoric
calls to mind, less Putnam's bland liberalism, and more Max Weber's
description of the Protestant ethic, in which an ethic of self-restraint
links an exigent religious faith to economic acquisitiveness and
initiative. 183
Weber's successors have demonstrated that the Protestant Ethic is
neither pervasive in Protestantism nor unique to it. " But the idea that
the spiritual orientation he identified can support capitalist economic
activity seems powerfully illustrated in contemporary CED. It is no
accident that "faith-based" organizations are among the most prominent
CED activists. They are associated with Islamic, Catholic, and
Protestant institutions. Moral themes associated with the Protestant
Ethic have influenced secular CED practitioners as well. These themes
are discipline, surveillance, personal formality, and the valorization of
wealth.
Weber emphasized that capitalist development required deferral of
gratification and resistance to impulses. In a well-known elaboration,
Clifford Geertz pointed out that this meant a constraint, not only of
selfish impulses, but of altruistic ones as well.'85 In a study of two
182. Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise: Human Reconstruction in America's
Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 195-202 (1992) (describing Grameen
Bank); Grameen Bank, Microfinance-Credit Lending Models, http://www.grameen-
info.org/mcredit/cmodel.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2001). For examples of American
microenterprise programs using peer lending models, see the descriptions of the
Womens' Self-Employment Project in Chicago in Solomon, supra, at 202-06. For an
example of the network of local programs in the Northeast supported by Working
Capital, see LISA J. SERVON, BOOTSTRAP CAPITAL: MICROENTERPRISE AND THE
AMERICAN POOR 67-73, 102-13 (1999).
183. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETmIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribners Sons 1958) (1904-05).
184. MAXIME RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM (Brian Pearce trans., Allen
Lane 1974) (1966); KURT SAMUELSSON, RELIGION AND ECONOMIC ACTION: THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC, THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, AND THE ABUSES OF SCHOLARSHIP (Univ.
of Toronto Press ed. 1993) (1957).
185. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, PEDDLERS AND PRINCES: SOCIAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN TWO INDONESIAN TOWNS (1963).
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Indonesian towns, he found economic development inhibited in one by
the short-sighted aggressiveness of its merchants and, in the other, by
the strong sense of duty to share income on the part of the elite, which
precluded capital accumulation." Both these perspectives were
represented in the "culture of poverty" literature on the American inner
city. In the view that became popular among conservatives, the key
problem was impulsive selfishness.'87 In an alternative view, the
problem was a disposition to share, coupled with the pervasiveness of
economic misfortune, which meant that some friend or relative always
had a compelling claim on one's resources." Either perspective lent
itself to the conclusion that these communities might benefit from
something like the norms of the Protestant Ethic.
The "culture of poverty" debate and indeed virtually all critical
discussion of culture and norms among the poor became anathema to
liberals in the 1960s. It came to seem unacceptably paternalistic and
imperialistic to make prescriptions for the poverty-stricken. However,
this liberal posture was undermined, first, by the coming to prominence
of conservative social policy elites who felt no such inhibitions, and
second, by the embrace of critical moralism by some of the most
effective leaders of poor communities.
Many of these leaders have been pastors. The Weberian rhetoric of
discipline is prominent in their pronouncements. Summarizing an
interview with Eugene Rivers of the Azusa Christian Community in
Dorchester, Massachusetts-Rivers is famous for his work with indigent
young people-George Packer writes, "[flor Rivers, discipline is
everything, and it depends on faith." 189
This theme is equally prominent in many secular projects. The first
of the "four principles" of the Grameen Bank is discipline."9  The
principles are elaborated in subsidiary precepts, the "Sixteen
Decisions," that make clear that discipline means a deferral of selfish
gratification, by saving and educating children for example, but also a
willingness to hold one's peers accountable." Members of peer
186. Id. at 125.
187. E.g., EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY: THE NATURE AND
FUTURE OF OUR URBAN CRISIS (1970).
188. ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN
65-66 n.22 (1967); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A
BLACK COMMUNITY (1974).
189. George Packer, A Tale of Two Movements: A Cross-Country Search for
Inspiration, NATION, Dec. 14, 1998, at 19, 22; see also Robert Worth, Amazing Grace:
Can Churches Save the Inner City?, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 28.
190. Solomon, supra note 182, at 218 n.160. The other three are unity, courage,
and hard work. Id.
191. Id.
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borrower groups in Grameen-style micro-enterprise programs are made
guarantors of each other's loans precisely so they will have to hold each
other's feet to the fire.
HUD's manual, Community Building in Public Housing, insists on
the importance of enforcing community standards and gives speedy
eviction of derelict tenants as an example. "2 The 1996 amendments to
the federal public housing statutes encourage PHAs to institute an
eviction policy called "One Strike and You're Out," under which
tenants who engage in criminal activity are promptly evicted; the
measures also included tough screening procedures to eliminate people
with recent criminal convictions at the application stage. 93 They also
mandate that PHAs require residents to perform six hours a month of
uncompensated "community service." 9
"Discipline" is one of the principal themes of the job-readiness
training provided by the widely replicated STRIVE program for
disadvantaged youth. During the first half of the program, "[tihe clear
message [is] 'stick to the rules or leave.' Some infractions [are]
punished by small fines, but those who present... continuing problems
[are] terminated ('fired' in the parlance of STRIVE) to maintain a sense
of responsibility."' 95
Cooperative Home Care Associates, the worker-owned health care
provider most of whose members are former welfare recipients, has
disciplinary rules that rival in severity those of the strictest capitalist
employers:
[Members] are warned once for allowing unknown visitors into
a patient's home, then fired for a second infraction. They get
one warning for failing to show up for work at a patient's
home; missing a second appointment is cause for dismissal. In
cases where less than standard care is noticed by supervisors,
or called to their attention by patients, the firm has a four-step
discipline procedure. One breach prompts informal
supervisory encouragement to improve. If the problem
happens a second time, members are warned in writing. If the
same problem happens a third time, the paraprofessional is
dismissed, subject to an appeal . . . . [Members] are fired
192. NAPARSTEK ET AL., supra note 69, at 53-54.
193. See Housing Opportunity Program Expansion Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
120, § 9, 110 Stat. 834, 836-38 (1996).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1437j(c)(I)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
195. Robert Burakoff, Harvard Bus. Sch., STRIVE (Case No. 9-399-054, Nov.
24, 1998), at 5.
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immediately for theft, substance abuse, or falsifying a time
sheet. '
Related to the theme of discipline is that of surveillance. CED
institutions extend the experience of being observed by one's neighbors
and colleagues. This is quite explicit in Jane Jacobs's "eyes on the
street" principle for physical structure design,"9 but it's equally apparent
in the design of institutions like the Grameen Bank or Cooperative
Home Care that repeatedly bring people into personal contact with each
other.
The rhetoric of surveillance occasionally arouses discomfort.
"Eyes on the street," which to Jacobs connotes safety, has some kinship
to Foucault's "panopticism," which connotes repression.'98  The
pervasive face-to-face relations and their pressures for cooperation may
remind some of the stifling, repressive quality of small town life
portrayed by writers like Sinclair Lewis and Sherwood Anderson.
Jacobs, however, insisted that the sort of community that typifies
vital urban neighborhoods is quite different from the small town or
suburban varieties." She argued that multistranded relations with the
local knowledge and trust needed for collective activity do not
necessarily entail intrusiveness or repressiveness. Such relations are
denser by definition than impersonal, single-stranded relations, but in
city contexts, there is a natural limit to their density:
A good city street neighborhood achieves a marvel of balance
between its people's determination to have essential privacy
and their simultaneous wishes for differing degrees of contact,
enjoyment or help from the people around.2'
Ideally, the city street, which for Jacobs is both a locus of social
practice and a school in which people acquire social skills, brings people
into contact with a range of others with whom they cannot expect to
196. FRANK ADAMS ET AL., COOPERATIVE HOME CARE ASSOCIATES: FROM
WORKING POOR TO WORKING CLASS THROUGH JOB OWNERSHIP 8 (1995).
197. JACOBS, supra note 162, at 35-36.
198. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-
228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
199. JACOBS, supra note 162, at 58-68. Actually, Jacobs avoided the word
community, probably precisely because of its connotations of intimacy and
pervasiveness. Nevertheless, her theory links urban vitality to multi-stranded social
relations, and consequent trust and local knowledge, of the sort for which CED
practitioners generally use the term community.
200. Id. at 59.
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become personally intimate."° Iris Young emphasized this when she
defined a conception of community close to Jacobs's as "the being
together of strangers."2 Repeated contact encourages various forms of
social interaction and collaboration. People watch out for each other's
children and property, give directions, help with parcels, and hold their
keys. But both the large number of people and cultural norms preclude
routine intimacy. The needed number of collaborations couldn't be
sustained if each entailed a high degree of intimacy. Jacobs contrasts
city neighborhoods to suburbs, where because of the absence of casual
street contact and cultural norms of impersonal collaboration, people are
ambivalent about collaboration. There, the prospect that any particular
act of assistance will involve you deeply in the beneficiary's life makes
it seem more demanding and risky.
Jacobs's is a more cosmopolitan view of community than that of
many CED proponents. It is quite hostile to the inclination toward
neighborhood autarchy one occasionally finds in the literature. Urban
communities differ from small towns in being part of a large closely-
connected fabric, and that means that the routine presence of outsiders in
one's own community, and the routine experience of being an outsider
in other people's communities, is an important defining quality. To the
extent that the CED Movement adopts Jacobs's view, it seems a
powerful response to concerns about privacy and regimentation.
As the CED Movement imports ideals of equality and participation
from the political to the economic sphere, it also brings from the
business to the political sphere norms of orderly, goal-oriented behavior.
Thus, personal formality is another dimension of the New Protestant
Ethic. In terms of organizational structure, CED institutions are
informal. But at the level of face-to-face interaction, they are often
moderately formal. Formality is valued because it facilitates orderly
collaboration, because it protects individuals from enforced intimacy,
and because it is associated with norms of respect accorded actors in
mainstream institutions. CED is serious business, its practitioners
emphasize. They spend a good deal of time teaching members and
others to read balance sheets and conduct meetings in accordance with
Robert's Rules of Order.
Romantic communitarians are troubled by the fact that local
currency systems monetize at least some exchanges that would have
occurred informally without the system. But Edgar Cahn, a local
currency proponent, defended this formality as not only necessary to
201. Id. at 61-62.
202. IRIS YOUNG, JUSnCE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237 (1990). For an
elaboration, see Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. Rnv. 1047,
1049-55 (1996).
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increase the level of exchange but as a good in itself. By associating
labor exchanges with mainstream economic transactions, he insists, local
currency enhances the sense of dignity and worth of these
203transactions.
The insistence on personal formality reaches an extreme in the
practice of Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, which has
played an important role in community organizing since the 1940s.
Alinsky's ostentatious toughness often seemed out-of-synch in the
1960s, when a more sentimental style was in vogue, but it fits well with
the trends of later decades. Alinsky organizers make a point of
repudiating "friends and neighbors politics" in favor of a "self-
consciously businesslike" approach:
Organizers encourage members to deal with one another in a
professional manner. A visitor notices an air of brisk
efficiency about the organization's office. Members typically
address one another, as well as their opponents, by surname;
and tend not to socialize with one another. These
organizations are definitely not conceived of as fellowships
bound by all-inclusive loyalties against a hostile
environment. 04
Many CED practitioners regard the Alinsky style as unattractive,
but hardly any would embrace the opposite extreme, which equates
community with pervasive intimacy and spontaneity. All would agree
that the repertory of CED skills includes tactics for maintaining social
distance and imposing structure on relations. Between the extremes a
broad range of styles is possible.
A final theme in the New Protestant ethic is the valorization of
wealth. In Weber's portrayal, early Protestantism exalted wealth as a
sign of God's favor. It gave an altruistic, communal dimension to
acquisitive success. Success was a form of tribute to God, as well as to
the entrepreneur. It also benefited the community, both because the
wealthy would have charitable obligations to their fellows and because
God's favor would be likely to spill over to the larger community.
There is a contemporary analogue to this view in the recent policy
literature that urges support for efforts to increase private wealth among
minorities, especially African-Americans.2 °s  The communitarian
203. MICHAEL H. SHUMAN, GOING LOCAL: CREATING SELF-RELIANT
COMMUNITIES IN A GLOBAL AGE 142 (1998).
204. PETER SKERRY, MEXICAN AMERICANS: THE AMBIVALENT MINORITY 151
(1993).
205. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHrTE
2002:377 425
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
rhetoric of the 1960s was suspicious of wealth and contemptuous of
ambitions for it. The more recent literature rejects these attitudes and
criticizes traditional social policy for focusing on income support and
employment training to the exclusion of savings, investment, and
entrepreneurialism among low income groups. It urges wealth creation
in minority communities as an important social goal. Although wealth
sometimes means public or collective assets, these writers also suggest
that private, individual wealth has social benefits. Wealthy individuals
are a potential philanthropic base for their communities. They are "role
models" that give hope to others in the community. They serve as
positive images to counter negative stereotypes held by outsiders about
group members. While the Old Protestant Ethic valued wealth as a sign
of God's favor, the new one values it as a sign of mainstream society's
favor.2"
The social perspective typified by the Protestant Ethic, and its
Catholic, Islamic, and secular analogues, is strongly congruent with the
functional themes of CED. By insisting on the link between spiritual
orientation and economic activity, these accounts are on their face
theories of multistranded relations. Economic relations are also spiritual
relations, they insist, and it is unlikely that one dimension of such
relations can be transformed without change in the other. Geographic
focus is less inherent in these ideas; it is only one potential focus for the
establishment of multistranded relations, but it is a prominent one.
Since political life and much of religious life is organized on a
geographical basis, it offers a relatively thick structure on which to
build.
Finally, the face-to-face encounter seems an important premise of
those who focus on spiritual and moral change as an aspect of economic
change. For example, the "Aschcroft provisions" of the 1996 welfare
reform bill authorizing states to sub-contract for the provision of
assistance through religious as well as secular nonprofits was inspired by
"historian Marvin Olasky's book The Tragedy of American Compassion,
which argues that government-run charity lacks the personal dimension
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 175-77 (1995); MICHAEL
SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY 139 (1990).
See generally THE REVEREND JESSE L. JACKSON, SR. & JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., IT'S
ABOUT THE MONEYI: THE FOURTH MOVEMENT OF THE FREEDOM SYMPHONY: How TO
BUILD WEALTH, GET ACCESS TO CAPITAL, AND ACHIEVE YOUR FINANCIAL DREAMS
(1999).
206. The IRS has upheld the charitable character of some programs that provide
business assistance to beneficiaries in low income neighborhoods who are neither poor
nor victims of discrimination in strikingly Calvinist rhetoric: "The recipients of
[benefits] in such cases are merely the instruments by which the charitable purposes are
sought to be accomplished." Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162-63.
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of religious charity and thus is inevitably powerless to change the
behavior of the poor.'
C. Political
The political intuitions that underpin the CED Movement can be
distinguished in terms of an interest group perspective and a republican
perspective.
1. THE INTEREST GROUP PERSPECTIVE
From the interest group perspective, CED looks like a strategy by
poor communities to increase the resources they extract from outside
institutions. The importance of multistranded relations, geographic
focus, and face-to-face encounters is that they facilitate more cohesive
and assertive organizations that can subsequently exert greater pressure,
especially against municipal government. This is the view of Saul
Alinksy and the Industrial Areas Foundation,08 and though most CDCs
have a more collaborative orientation, they would recognize his view of
political bargaining as part of what they do.
However, the idea that CED is a potentially powerful strategy of
poor people's politics contradicts a critique that was previously quite
influential and remains of interest. The political discourse of the 1960s
tended to be suspicious of poor people's organizations. Conservatives
suspected them of demagoguery; radicals suspected them of co-optation.
Both portrayed them as likely to generate leaders who would sell out
their constituents. They might do so by accepting personal favors from
outside officials or businesses in return for inducing their followers to
accept or support projects of little, or even negative, value to the
community. Or they might scare away potentially beneficial projects by
inciting their followers to make impossible demands. Or they might
trade off the interests of the community as a whole in order to favor the
interests of a sub-group of friends and supporters. No one doubts that
such activities occurred in the past and continue to occur today, but at
one time their likelihood in poor neighborhoods was widely thought so
great as to make almost any effort to encourage local organizing
dubious.
207. Ambrosius, supra note 153, at 135, 145 (footnotes omitted).
208. See SKERRY, supra note 204, at 144-61; SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR
RADICALS 106-09 (1946).
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One of the most influential expressions of this view from the left
came in two books by Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven."9 They
argued that the key political resource of the poor is their capacity to
disrupt.1 Disruption might take the form of electoral rebellion, or
excessive welfare claims, or strikes, or simply rioting. In their view,
fear of disruption was the principal motivation of elites in yielding
benefits to the poor.2 ' In order to sustain this fear, it was important that
disruption occur with some severity and frequency. In this situation,
organizing is inherently cooptive because, by its very nature, it tends to
dampen disruption. The process of organizing itself might be
disruptive, but once an organization stabilized, the leaders, even if well-
meaning, would consider it their business to channel the behavior of
their constituents along orderly paths. In doing so, they would
undermine their principal resource; the elites, no longer anxious about
disruption, would concede less. Moreover, once organizations began to
stabilize, the "iron law of oligarchy" would kick in, and leaders would
feather their own nests at the expense of the rank-and-file.
Of several objections to this argument, one is of particular interest.
The argument involves a non-sequitur. Organizing is considered
inherently bad because it mitigates disruption, but according to the
argument, it is not disruption itself that induces the elites to provide
benefits, but the fear of disruption. Moreover, the inducement must
involve, not just the fear of disruption, but the expectation that
concessions will reduce disruption that would otherwise occur. And
since disruption has a cost to both the poor and the elites, it is in their
interest to disrupt only when the benefits from elite anxiety exceed these
costs. It is thus not in the interest of the poor to maximize disruption.
But without organization, why should they be able to discern or
approach the optimal level of disruption? Without organization, they
cannot collectively deliberate on the matter. They cannot credibly
promise the elites to limit disruption in return for benefits. And in many
circumstances, the threat of disruption may be less credible from a
209. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977) [hereinafter PIVEN &
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS]; FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971)
[hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR]. The intense fear of co-
optation from organization also appears in Alinsky's work. While Alinsky was more
sympathetic than Piven and Cloward to poor people's organization, he encouraged
suspicion that any form of collaboration with government would lead to co-optation.
Thus, he vehemently opposed the Community Action Program. See Saul D. Alinsky,
The War on Poverty-Political Pornography, 21 J. Soc. ISSUES 41 (1965).
210. E.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS, supra note 209, at
3.
211. E.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 209, at 3-4.
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diffuse mass than an organized group. Piven and Cloward portrayed the
poor as engaged in a kind of bargaining with the elites, but they focused
exclusively on the costs of organized bargaining and largely ignored the
costs of disorganized bargaining."' Even under Piven and Cloward's
dark assumptions-a zero sum negotiation, selfish elites, weak
leadership or organizational capacity among the poor-there remains an
important, potentially valuable function for organization in cutting deals
exchanging acquiescence for resources. If we relax the dark
assumptions, we can see additional functions, such as those emphasized
by the economic rationales-mobilizing voluntary effort, aggregating
information about community needs, and coordinating projects.
We can't say more than that these are potential benefits. It is
surely true that people sometimes do worse with organization than
without. Even in such cases, however, the problem might be better
understood as a matter of too little organization, rather than too much.
A promising hypothesis holds that the returns to outside investment in a
community will be highest when the level and density of organization in
the community is either relatively low or relatively high. Returns to the
outside investor are high when organization is slight because the investor
encounters little opposition and can design his project to maximize his
own interests. Returns to the community are high when organization is
great. At high levels of organization, the community has the capacity,
not only to prevent disruption that impairs the investment, but to
facilitate support for investment and to bargain for a share of the
returns. An organized community can promise credibly that the
property won't be vandalized, or that neighboring parks will be
maintained, or that job training will be configured to complement
investment in a new business. While returns are thus likely highest at
the poles of the organizational spectrum, the distribution of those returns
will vary from pole to pole. At the low-organization end, the outside
investor captures most of the returns. At the high-organization end, the
returns are divided between investor and community.
212. Piven and Cloward attempted to show historically that the poor did better in
times of disorganized disruption than in times of organized bargaining. Their thesis was
being contradicted empirically, however, as they wrote. As they later acknowledged,
under the Nixon Administration, well after the subsiding of the disruptive protest of the
1960s on which they had pinned their hopes, social welfare benefits underwent their
greatest expansion since the New Deal. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward,
The Historical Sources of the Contemporary Relief Debate, in BLOCK ET. AL, THE MEAN
SEASON: THE ATrACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 3, 3-39 (1987).
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At intermediate levels of organization, however, the hypothesis
predicts that investor returns, and hence, investment, will be lowest.
We might visualize the situation as a U-curve:
13
Figure 1
High High
Outside Community
Returs Returns
Level of Organization
Returns are lowest at intermediate magnitudes of organization
because here organizations are strong enough to raise large costs but not
strong enough to provide large benefits. Moderate levels of
organization are sufficient to bring a lawsuit, or pack a meeting of the
zoning authority, or mount a couple of demonstrations, or encourage
vandalism. However, they are not strong enough to bind the community
in ways that would assure a prospective investor that he will not face
disruption or will receive support. The disorganized community cannot
credibly promise that there will be no demonstrations, lawsuits, or
vandalism. It cannot assure police protection or job training or
complementary investments.
Moreover, at intermediate levels of organization, the danger that an
organization will pursue narrow group interests at the expense of the
larger community may be highest. As an organization expands to
include more community interests, this becomes harder to do. The
closer the organization comes to including the entire community, the less
213. I have taken the U-curve and the accompanying intuition from an analysis by
Joel Rogers regarding labor relations. Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further
"Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REV.
1, 32-37.
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potential there is that the organization will see its own interests as
different from those of the community. The problem of the "iron law of
oligarchy" can be mitigated as the organization's internal processes
strengthen. Thus, when we see organizations selling out the community
or their own members, the most plausible diagnosis will sometimes be
too little, rather than too much, organization.
Piven and Cloward's diagnosis seemed to reflect a common
assumption of 1960s radicalism that the best that the poor could hope for
from the capitalist state was a decent welfare system. The favorable
response they anticipated to unorganized disruption was increased
welfare benefits. Of course, this strategy no longer seems politically
viable, and it is not attractive to many of the people it was supposed to
benefit. To the extent that poor communities are looking for
investment, many forms of disruptive protest seem transparently
counter-productive. Disorder in lower-class neighborhoods leads
quickly to private disinvestment, and even a public sector that feels the
kind of pressure to placate the poor, on which Piven and Cloward
relied, would not respond by putting resources into long-term projects
that could pay off only with local collaboration.
2. THE REPUBLICAN PERSPECTIVE
Republican political thought offers another perspective on the CED
Movement. Republicanism has its origins in antiquity; it received its
canonical modem formulations in the Renaissance and the seventeenth
century, and was strongly influential in eighteenth and nineteenth
century American thought. Some of the most distinctive themes of the
thought of Jefferson and Lincoln and of the Knights of Labor and the
People's Party are best understood in the light of Republicanism." 4 The
CED Movement has arisen during a period that has also seen a
"Republican Revival" in political theory, and the rhetoric and practices
of CED resonate with Republican themes.
Republicanism is an exceptionally strong form of democracy, one
with a preference for small, geographically-based political units. It
exalts qualities of civic virtue and deliberation that have some
resemblance to the sociological notion of social capital. Like
economics, it also has an interest in material incentives, though it is
primarily concerned with incentives for political rather than economic
activity. The most distinctive political contribution of Republicanism is
214. See generally BRUCE LAURIE, ARTISANS INTO WORKERS: LABOR IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1989); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975).
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its insistence that democracy entails powerful constraints on property
arrangements.215 Property is important to Republicans because it confers
power. The Republicans deny any strong distinction between the kind
of power property confers and political power. It follows for them that
the egalitarian values that all democrats apply to the political realm must
also be applied in the economic realm.
One implication of this view is a preference for economic self-
sufficiency and a concern about nonresident, "absentee" ownership.
Integration into broad-based markets subjects the community to forces
beyond the reach of self-government. And since property confers
power, outside ownership of property undermines the political autonomy
of the community. In nineteenth century American republican thought,
the railroad was a paradigmatic nemesis of self-government. The
railroad was controlled by outsiders, but it had enormous power over
local affairs. Its monopolistic decisions over rates and scheduling could
spell life or death for small agricultural communities. At the same time,
the railroad, by fusing once isolated local economies into far-flung
markets, subjected them to volatile product price swings that
undermined stability and independence. Republicanism thus favored
both institutions that afforded local communities some autonomy from
outside economic pressures and, at the regional and national planes,
institutions that would subject these broader pressures to democratic
control.
The Republican political ideal also had implications for property
arrangements within the community. As it calls for economic autonomy
at the community level, Republicanism calls for "propertied
independence" at the individual level. On this view, self-government
requires that the citizen have a stake in the polity that links her fate to
that of her fellows. The stake makes it likely that the individual will
share in the successes and failures of collective decision; it is both an
inducement to participation and a bond against recklessness. In former
times, the paradigmatic Republican stake was landed property. The
immobility of land holds people in place and binds them to their
neighbors. Landowners, the French Republican Anne Robert Jacques
Turgot wrote, "are attached to the land by their property; they cannot
cease to take an interest in the district where it is placed .... It is the
possession of land . . . which, linking the possessor to the State,
215. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 21-88, 211-40, 248-
76 (1997); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335
(1991).
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constitutes true citizenship ... 2 6 By contrast, proprietors of liquid,
mobile capital "belong to no place." 217  Thus, politics takes a
geographical form; geographically contiguous property constitutes
people as a collective with a common identity.
As the space for yeoman farmers in the American economy shrank
in the nineteenth century, Republicans recognized that they had to adapt
their vision to accommodate a more integrated system with larger
production units. They responded with two sorts of proposals. At the
local level, they favored the organization of production in terms of
cooperatives, a form of egalitarian worker ownership. Above the
national level, they favored programs supporting small business and
shielding it from big business. Shielding took the form of antitrust and
related laws. Support took the form of government programs providing
credit and technical assistance and facilitating collaboration among small
businesses to attain economies of scale in the purchase of inputs,
research and development, and the marketing of their products. A
panoply of New Deal programs in the agricultural sphere represent the
most fully elaborated, ambitiously implemented example of the
modernized Republican vision.21 The Republican vision continues to be
reflected in public policies that favor home ownership, in part because
that the economic independence it fosters makes for better citizens. The
income tax exemption for interest on home mortgages, the largest
housing subsidy, is sometimes justified in Republican terms. HUD
Secretary Jack Kemp argued for a shift from rental to ownership
subsidies on the ground that owners "vote more regularly and become
more engaged in the democratic process."219
In nineteenth-century America, the Republican commitment to
propertied independence had both reactionary and radical implications.
On the one hand, an exclusionary interpretation concluded that self-
government required the disfranchisement of those who lacked property.
On the other, an inclusionary interpretation held that self-government
required the redistribution of some minimal amount of property to all
216. WILLIAM SEWELL, WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF
LABOR FROM THE OLD REGIME TO 1848, at 127 (1980).
217. Id. (footnote omitted)
218. See generally GRANT MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY
(1953).
219. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOME OWNERSHIP AND AFFORDABLE
HOUSING: THE OPPORTUNITIES (1991). Survey research shows a significant correlation
(controlling for income, age, education level, and the length of time a person has been
or expects to remain in the community) of home ownership with membership in
nonprofessional organizations, knowledge of local political leaders, voting, and self-
reported local political activity. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives
and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECoN. 354 (1999).
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citizens. Senator Calhoun's insistence that property-less laborers were
unqualified for political participation was solidly grounded in
Republican premises; so was General Sherman's insistence that
meaningful emancipation would entail giving each former slave "40
acres and a mule."
There is a modem version of this dialectic. As political
participation rates decline, scholars are again interested in what
motivates people to participate, and are again considering the role of
property. Robert Ellickson has emphasized an important limitation on
the incentives on nonowner residents, tenants, to participate in local
political processes."' Many collective improvements to the community,
such as better schools, parks, or policing, increase private property
values by an amount proportionate to the general valuation of the
improvements. Public benefits are thus privately appropriated through
real estate appreciation. Ellickson pointed out that this limits the
incentives for tenants to participate in local politics, because property
value increases tend to be passed on to them in the form of higher
rents. 21 To the extent that public achievements translate into rent
increases, tenants cannot benefit from participation.2 2
The prescriptions Ellickson drew from this observation are in the
tradition of Calhoun-disfranchisement of nonowners. (This is
constitutionally impossible in general elections, but Ellickson favored
the remission of governmental functions to private associations or
special-purpose districts constituted exclusively of owners.) For its part,
the CED Movement would respond in the tradition of Sherman,
proposing to create and extend a set of ownership interests that depart
from conventional private property in some respects but that are
adequate for the Republican purpose of grounding and motivating
responsible participation.
From a more general perspective, Republicanism gives a political
cast to the three defining themes of CED. By insisting on linking
political and economic roles, Republicanism prescribes a form of
relational density as a vindication of democracy. By taking ownership
of real property as the critical economic underpinning of local
democracy, Republicanism also adopts a geographical focus. And by
insisting on the importance of direct participation, it gives priority in
political terms to face-to-face relations.
220. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners' Associations, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1519, 1547-54 (1982).
221. Id. at 1548.
222. Id.; see also Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods,
48 DuKE L.J. 75, 92-95 (1998). Ellickson's analysis is based in part on the assumption
that local governments have little capacity to redistribute wealth.
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Specific CED practices also resonate with the Republican program.
CED is an effort to subject economic forces to democratic control.
Economic self-sufficiency is an important background value in much
CED discourse. Its emphasis on security of tenure and, sometimes,
home ownership, can be seen as a form of propertied "independence."
Its characteristic business programs provide credit and technical support
to small, locally-controlled businesses in the manner of late nineteenth-
century Republicanism. The Republican's favorite business form, the
cooperative, makes a frequent appearance on the CED landscape.
Moreover, the charitable corporation, especially in the form of the
CDC, manifests many Republican themes.
The Republican prescription of local economic self-sufficiency
seems nawve and anachronistic in many respects. It would be
implausible to deny that the most important responses to poverty and
racial injustice require national policies and political coalitions. Butwe
have noted that there are economic rationales for local development
initiatives, and the Republican perspective seems responsive to at least
two current practical political contingencies.
The first is the political lesson of two decades of welfare cutbacks
culminating in a reckless dismantling of the core public assistance
programs led by a liberal democratic administration. The lesson many
inner city leaders have drawn from this experience-that reliance on
welfare involves dangerous political vulnerability-resonates with
Republican principles. These principles condemn dependence on
economic favors of the state as incompatible with political
independence.223 This seems to approximate the prevalent view among
many inner-city leaders. Dependence on welfare now seems too fragile
a basis for stable community life, since shifting political coalitions can
wipe out these programs. Like traditional Republicans, these leaders see
a potentially more stable basis in private wealth and economic activity.
To be sure, private property is no less a creature of state and national
government policy than welfare benefits. There is no natural definition
of private property rights. We depend on the government to delineate
their boundaries. And the value of these rights depends substantially on
the capacity of the state to enforce them against violators. However,
legal and cultural norms give private property higher normative priority
than welfare property, and institutional arrangements protect it more
strongly.
223. Compare, for example, the eighteenth-century English Republican attack on
the dependence of Whig "placemen" on wealth accumulated in connection with
government bonds, POCOCK, supra note 213, at 425-26, 477-86, with Saul Alinsky's
attack on welfare dependence in poor communities, Alinsky, supra note 208.
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The second political reality with which the Republican view
resonates is that some poor communities have greater political, rather
than economic, power. By definition, poor people tend to have little or
no capital, income, or marketable skills, and only stake the most
uncertain claims on society to improve their condition through
redistribution. On the other hand, basic constitutional norms require
that political power be apportioned with formal equality. Formally
equal political power is not always worth anything, but sometimes it is.
To the extent that it enables poor communities to influence elections in
broader jurisdictions, they may be able to trade it for resources. To the
extent that it gives them direct power over their use that outside owners
make of property within the communities, they can use their power to
generate economic benefits they could not attain through market
processes. Much of CED can be seen as an effort to translate political
into economic power, and in circumstances where disadvantaged groups
have more of the former than the latter, this may be a plausible strategy.
III. CONCLUSION: THE MURAL TEST
A mural that covers the side of a building on Dudley Street depicts
some of the major figures in the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative's
remarkable efforts to revitalize that community. The impressive new
construction in the neighborhood sits amid many older, still deteriorated
buildings that have a good deal of graffiti on them. Although the mural
sits on one of the old, unrenovated buildings, DSNI staff emphasize to
visitors that there has not been a mark of graffiti on it in the several
years since it was painted.
Here is a vivid illustration of all three logics of collective action.
The mural's pristine condition reflects at once informal coordination that
enhances the value of an economic investment, social capital, and
collective discipline that enhances bargaining power with outsiders. A
community group that can credibly promise this type of support can
thereby induce significant investments both by its own members and
outsiders.
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